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MAKING SENSE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
Christopher Buccafusco†
Intellectual property (IP) scholars have long struggled to explain the
boundaries of and differences between copyright and patent law.  This Article
proposes a novel explanation: copyright and patent can be fruitfully under-
stood as establishing a dichotomy between two different groups of human
senses.  Copyright traditionally involves objects addressed to the senses of
sight and hearing while products appealing to touch, taste, and smell are the
province of utility patent law.  The Article begins by establishing this descrip-
tive proposition, and it shows how some of the most contested areas of IP
(e.g., copyright’s useful articles doctrine and design patent law) involve
breaches of this sensory dichotomy.  Next, I argue that the sensory dichotomy
in IP reflects the sensory hierarchy in traditional Western aesthetic theory.
According to this tradition, sight and hearing are “high” senses capable of
unconstrained aesthetic and cultural experiences.  Touch, taste, and smell,
by contrast, are “low” senses because their connection to natural bodily needs
constrains their aesthetic capacities.  IP law’s treatment of the senses in copy-
right and patent law matches this hierarchy.
In recent years, however, developments in the social sciences and aes-
thetic theory have undermined fundamental principles of Western aesthetic
theory.  This research suggests that sight and hearing are not as aesthetically
unconstrained and functionless, nor are touch, taste, and smell as aestheti-
cally constrained and functional, as was previously believed.  Accordingly, I
argue that IP law should treat appeals to the senses uniformly.  Works that
express or communicate ideas, emotions, or pleasures to any of the five senses
in ways that create original works of authorship should be potentially copy-
rightable.  The Article concludes with an analysis of this proposal’s effects on
various creative fields, including tactile objects, fashion, culinary dishes,
and yoga.
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“Going to the Feelies this evening, Henry?” enquired the Assistant
Predestinator.  “I hear the new one at the Alhambra is first-rate.  There’s a
love scene on a bearskin rug; they say it’s marvellous.  Every hair of the bear
reproduced.  The most amazing tactual effects.”1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Alice is trying to teach her young daughter to play
catch with a tennis ball.  Alice notices that the combination of her
daughter’s imperfect hand–eye coordination and the ball’s rubber
surface causes the ball to bounce out of her daughter’s hand unless
her daughter happens to time her grasp perfectly.  Alice, a mechani-
cal engineer by training, realizes that the ball would be much easier to
catch if all of its energy was not transferred directly into her daugh-
ter’s hand.  To solve the problem, Alice designs a ball made from
floppy, elastomeric filaments that radiate from a central core region.
The filaments absorb excess energy when the ball strikes a person’s
hand, and they give way to the fingers easily, making the ball easy to
grasp.  It never occurs to Alice that her ball might be fun to hold or
attractive to look at.
1 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 39 (1932).
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Now imagine Bruce, an industrial designer.  Bruce is interested in
the tactility of objects—how they feel in one’s hands.  He wants to
make a product that is both soothing and fun to hold.  He has the
idea of creating a ball made from floppy, elastomeric filaments that
radiate from a central core region.  The central region is solid, creat-
ing a calming sensation in the holder when the ball is grasped firmly,
while the floppy filaments produce little sensations of joy when
brushed with the hand.  Bruce’s design is identical to Alice’s.  It never
occurs to Bruce that his ball might be particularly easy for children to
catch or attractive to look at.
Finally, imagine Catherine, an artist.  Catherine is passionate
about exploring visual form through modern consumer media such as
plastics, aluminum, and paper.  On a trip to the science museum with
her son she sees one of those plasma electricity balls that when
touched causes little streams of visible electricity to flow from the
ball’s core to its glass surface.  When she gets back to her studio that
afternoon she designs a small sculpture made of floppy, elastomeric
filaments radiating from a central core region.  To Catherine, the vis-
ual form of the sculpture symbolizes the vitality of human “energy,”
and she hopes that those who look at it will experience emotions of
awe and wonder.  Catherine’s sculpture is identical to the balls cre-
ated by Alice and Bruce.  It never occurs to Catherine that the sculp-
ture might be particularly easy for children to catch or delightful for
people to hold.  In fact, she would be appalled if people touched her
sculpture.
Alice, Bruce, and Catherine have all designed the famous
KOOSH ball,2 albeit for very different reasons.  Although they have
each created the exact same work, if they seek legal protection for
their creations through U.S. intellectual property (IP) laws, they will
receive different treatment.  When Alice seeks to protect the ball’s
usefulness as a training device for young children she will file for a
utility patent.  She will have to prove that the ball is useful, novel, and
nonobvious.3  If, after review,4 she convinces the Patent Office that
2 U.S. Patent No. 4,756,529 (filed July 12, 1988).
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.”); id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identi-
cally disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences be-
tween the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”).
4 Id. § 131 (“The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the application
and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant is
entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor.”).
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she has met these requirements, she will receive a set of IP rights that
will last for twenty years from the date she filed her application.5
The visual form of Catherine’s sculpture, by contrast, will receive
federal copyright protection from the moment it is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.6  She may, in rare instances,7 have to prove
that the sculpture is original (i.e., not copied from another source)
and minimally creative.8  If she clears these low hurdles, she will ob-
tain a set of exclusive rights that will last for the rest of her life plus an
additional seventy years.9
If Bruce wants to protect the tangible feel of his design by
preventing others from making similar balls, he will likely have to file
the same utility patent application as Alice and clear the same high
hurdles of usefulness, novelty, and nonobviousness.  Should he in-
stead seek copyright protection for the tactile features of the design,
he would likely be unsuccessful.  While copyright law protects the vis-
ual “aesthetic” form of works of authorship, it does not extend to the
“functional” features of those works.10  The tactile sensations of grasp-
ing Bruce’s design are likely functional, and thus noncopyrightable,
features of the design.  Although Catherine’s sculpture contains iden-
tical features, in her work they serve only the aesthetic purpose of
portraying the visual form of the work and are entirely copyrightable.
5 See id. § 154(a)(2) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall
be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from
the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States or, if the
application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications
under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title, from the date on which the earliest such
application was filed.”).
6 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”); id. § 302(a)
(“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation . . . .”).
7 For example, if her registration is rejected by the Copyright Office or invalidated in
an infringement action.
8 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some mini-
mal degree of creativity.  To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a
slight amount will suffice.  The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.” (cita-
tion omitted)).
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978 . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the
author’s death.”).
10 See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
that the Copyright Office did not abuse its discretion in refusing to register a copyright for
the KOOSH ball where the Copyright Office examiners refused to consider the feel of the
ball as a basis for registration on the grounds that the feel was a “functional part of the
work”).
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Considerable judicial and scholarly commentary has attempted to
delineate the precise boundaries between copyright and patent law,
often with limited success.11  Both regimes aspire to improve the qual-
ity of life by promoting the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”12  At
a basic level, patent law is the domain of the useful and functional,
while copyright law is the preserve of the aesthetic.  But it is often
difficult to determine whether a given work deserves copyright or pat-
ent protection.  Copyright law struggles to distinguish between pro-
tectable aesthetic components and unprotectable functional ones,
while patent law worries about the incorporation of “subjective” aes-
thetic standards in the realm of the purely useful.13  The example of
the KOOSH ball offers a novel way of reframing these issues.
In this Article, I argue that IP law, in its attempt to distinguish
between aesthetics and utility, has established a dichotomy between
works appealing to the different human senses.  Works that appeal to
the senses of sight and hearing—those that produce visual or aural
sensation—are potentially subject to copyright protection.  Works that
appeal to the sense of touch—those that produce tactile, haptic,14
proprioceptive,15 or otherwise embodied sensation—are potentially
subject to utility patent protection.16  Classic examples demonstrate
this dichotomy.  Paintings and songs are appropriate subjects for copy-
right protection, while an ergonomically designed chair is an appro-
priate subject for patent protection.
Of course, many objects incorporate features that appeal to mul-
tiple senses, but those features are eligible for either copyright or pat-
ent protection only to the extent that they are directed at visual/aural
11 For successful examples, see generally Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual
Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1483–1508 (2010) (arguing that the differences between
copyright and patent law reflect differences in the styles of creativity and innovation associ-
ated with different products) and Jonathan Masur & David Fagundes, Costly Intellectual Prop-
erty, 65 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 59), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1441987 (summarizing the various ways that costs associated with patent and copy-
right regimes affect social welfare).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13 See infra Part II.B.
14 This Article uses the terms “tactile” and “haptic” synonymously.  Alberto Gallace
and Charles Spence note that the terms have different meanings in psychology literature:
[T]he term “haptics” has a very specific meaning, restricted to describing
those tactile stimuli that impinge on the skin, and which are perceived by
means of a person actively palpating an object or surface, such as when
actively exploring an object held in the hand.  By contrast, the term “tac-
tile” is used to describe those tactile stimuli that are delivered passively to
the skin.
Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence, The Science of Interpersonal Touch: An Overview, 34
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 246, 247 n.1 (2010).
15 Proprioception is defined as “the perception of the position and movements of the
body.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Dec. 2011), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
267353#eid85617289.
16 For the moment, I am bracketing discussion of design patents. See infra Part I.C.2.
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sensation on the one hand or tactile sensation on the other.  Attempts
to elide this sensory dichotomy are likely to meet with confusion and
rejection.  Predictably, copyright law’s “useful articles doctrine” (pro-
tecting works of authorship that combine functional and aesthetic fea-
tures) and design patent law (protecting the visual ornamental
features of utilitarian objects) are among the most confused and con-
tested areas in IP law.17
Part I of this Article establishes the descriptive claim that IP18 can
be understood, in part,19 as establishing a dichotomy between works
that generate visual and aural sensation and those that generate tac-
tile, gastronomic, or olfactory sensation.  It explores the ways in which
IP law sorts works appealing to the different senses and the confusion
caused by attempted transgressions of the sensory boundaries.
The critical tradition in academia teaches that differences typi-
cally imply hierarchies,20 and this is as true for the senses as it is for
race and gender.  Recent work in the history of aesthetic theory has
shown how philosophical accounts of the differences between the
senses almost invariably attribute different values and potentials to the
senses.  Writers from Plato and Aristotle to modern aestheticians have
distinguished between the “high” senses of sight and hearing and the
17 See infra Part I.C.
18 References to IP in this Article refer only to copyright and patent law.  At present, it
ignores the interesting ways in which trademark law treats the different senses. See, e.g.,
Amanda E. Compton, Acquiring a Flavor for Trademarks: There’s No Common Taste in the World,
8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 340, 354–59 (2010) (considering trademark protection for
flavor).  Beyond the fact that such an expansion would make the Article unwieldy, many of
the basic issues involved in trademark law are different from those in copyright and patent
law.  Whereas copyright and patent seek to encourage the creation of products that have
value in their own right, the principal goal of trademark law is to enable consumers to
make better choices about the products they wish to buy. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999).  Accordingly,
notions of the aesthetic or communicative value of the different senses arise in trademark
law differently than in copyright and patent law because trademark law values a good’s
sensory qualities only as signals of other qualities and therefore need not seriously grapple
with aesthetic theory.
19 Of course, patent law covers much more than inventions designed to generate tac-
tile pleasure.  Some inventions have no relationship to the human senses whatsoever in-
cluding many inventions in the fields of electronics, software, and plants.  In addition, the
sensory distinction is certainly not the only or even the best way to think about the differ-
ences between copyright and patent.  Other explanations based on economics, markets,
and creativity are also valuable.
20 See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE
HUMAN SPECIES 145 (R.D. Laing ed., Random House 1st American ed. 1970) (1966)
(“Method and system are simply two ways of defining identities by means of the general
grid of differences.”); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TO-
WARD THE NEGRO, 1550–1812 253 (1968) (“[O]n the spectrum of human colors [Europe-
ans] were at one end, and it was very tempting, especially for light-skinned residents of the
British Isles, to place them at the top.”).
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“low” senses of touch, taste, and smell.21  While the sensations af-
forded by sights and sounds are deemed aesthetic, those derived from
the touch, taste, and smell of objects are merely functional.  While the
former can produce art and enable transcendence of the body, the
latter cannot aspire to truly artistic expression because they are mired
in physical desires of the flesh.  Painting and music can and should
produce “art for art’s sake,” but the low pleasures arise only from bod-
ily functions.  Accordingly, visual and aural pleasures exist in the un-
constrained realm of pure culture where anything goes regardless of
taste.  In contrast, the low senses are naturally determined and subject
to biological constraints.
Part II argues that the hierarchy between sight and sound on the
one hand and touch, taste, and smell on the other emerges in IP law
as well.  IP law’s sensory dichotomy recapitulates the tradition in West-
ern aesthetic theory that ascribes different values to different human
senses.  Copyright is the realm of aesthetic production, while patent
protects creations that are merely utilitarian.  Thus, since works ap-
pealing to the low senses can only be useful, nonexpressive, and func-
tionally and biologically constrained, they are unsuited for copyright
protection.
In Part III, I draw on recent research in contemporary and evolu-
tionary aesthetics and haptic and culinary communication to chal-
lenge this sensory hierarchy.  Traditional aesthetic theory views
preferences for visual art and music as culturally relative, nonfunc-
tional, and unconstrained.  I argue that, over the last two decades, the
strong version of this view has become increasingly unsupportable in
light of discoveries in the emerging field of evolutionary aesthetics.
According to this line of research, just as humans tend to prefer sweet
and fatty foods because preferences for sweet and fatty foods gener-
ated survival advantages for our ancestors, humans will tend to prefer
visual and auditory stimuli that conferred evolutionary advantages on
our ancestors.  This hypothesis finds support in crosscultural studies,
experiments with “precultural” infants, and neuroimagining tech-
niques that have found widespread preferences for many fundamental
features of the visual and musical arts.  As Denis Dutton writes,
“[c]heesecake speaks to innate pleasure preferences, but so does Wag-
ner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen.”22
21 On the role of visual culture theory in the law, see generally Christopher J. Buc-
cafusco, Gaining/Losing Perspective on the Law, or Keeping Visual Evidence in Perspective, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 609, 613–16 (2004) (applying the works of visual culture theorists to issues
relating to the use of visual evidence at trial and in society more generally).
22 DENIS DUTTON, THE ART INSTINCT: BEAUTY, PLEASURE, & HUMAN EVOLUTION 99
(2009).
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As evolutionary aesthetics has highlighted the functions and con-
straints imposed on visual and auditory pleasure, other new research
undermines the notion that the low senses are incapable of expressive
and aesthetic communication.  Research on interpersonal touch and
on haptic technologies (those designed to enable tactile engagement
with objects and people) demonstrates the ways in which touch can be
used to create meaning.  Similarly, research on cuisine has shown how
both elite and more mundane cooking can produce aesthetically
meaningful and expressive combinations of tastes and aromas.  Tactile
and gustatory works now appear to fit well within traditional para-
digms of aesthetic theory.
Part IV turns from the descriptive to the normative and argues for
a change to IP law that recognizes the unity of the senses.  I propose
that the features of works that appeal to any of the senses in such a
way as to express or communicate ideas, pleasures, or emotions
should be potentially23 copyrightable.  Patent law should remain the
appropriate regime for features of works that have nonexpressive and
noncommunicative utilitarian value.
Returning to the KOOSH ball creations of Alice, Bruce, and
Catherine, Alice’s ball would remain an appropriate subject for patent
protection, and Catherine’s ball would still be copyrightable.  To the
extent that Bruce’s design appeals to the sense of touch in such a way
as to express or communicate ideas, pleasures, or emotions, it should
fall within the province of copyright.  Additionally, these categories
should hold for works whose features include both aesthetic and func-
tional aspects, and the law will have to devise some method for sepa-
rating the aesthetic from the functional.  But at least it will be putting
things in the correct categories.  The Article concludes with examples
of how such an analysis might productively apply to fashion design,
physical activities such as yoga, and culinary dishes.
By focusing on the formal structure of IP law, this Article sets
aside fundamental issues about the utilitarian, welfarist consequences
of altering IP law.24  As I have argued in a previous paper, with respect
to copyright protection of recipes, the law gets the right answer but
for the wrong reason.25  Copyright law fails to recognize culinary cre-
23 I say “potentially” because the works will still have to clear copyright hurdles of
originality and creativity. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991).
24 See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 31, 31 (2011) (arguing that cognitive biases associated with creation and own-
ership of IP may generate substantial inefficiencies in markets); Christopher Buccafusco &
Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25
(2010) (summarizing the results of a set of empirical studies designed to test the condi-
tions under which creation and ownership inefficiencies occur).
25 See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas
Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1155–56 (2007).
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ations as suitable for protection because it deems them either func-
tional or unoriginal.26  I argue that this ruling reflects a
misunderstanding of the nature of gustatory communication and that
culinary dishes are capable of meeting the formal demands of copy-
right law.27  The lack of recognition is the right result, however, since
other features of culinary industry perform the same creativity-protect-
ing roles that formal law does.28  Accordingly, copyrighting dishes
would be economically inadvisable.
The same may be true for the fields discussed here.  There are
good reasons to think that fashion design and yoga may not need cop-
yright protection to thrive creatively.29  Nonetheless, such a conclu-
sion reflects only the current state of those fields.  Should things
change such that some form of copyright protection becomes desira-
ble, this Article clears the way for its recognition.
I
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE DICHOTOMY OF
THE SENSES
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”30  Since the Founding, the parallel construction of
the clause has been read to legitimate the creation of the separate
fields of copyright and patent law—the former dealing with “Science,”
“Authors,” and “Writings” and the latter with “useful Arts,” “Inven-
tors,” and “Discoveries.”31  And since that time, Congress has estab-
lished two distinct regimes with different rules governing subject
matter, creativity hurdles, formalities, and scope of protection.32
Under the current version of the copyright statute, protection is avail-
able to original (i.e., not copied) and minimally creative works of au-
thorship as soon as they are fixed in a tangible medium of
26 See id. at 1127–30.
27 See id. at 1130–40.
28 See id. at 1153–55.
29 See KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITA-
TION SPURS INNOVATION (forthcoming May 2012).
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31 See L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
365, 367 (2000) (“The parallel construction makes it easy to identify the copyright clause:
‘The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive right to their . . . Writings.’”).
32 The first statutes relating to copyright and patent were passed in 1790. See Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (establishing copyrights); Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1
Stat. 109 (establishing patents).  The copyright statute was entitled, “An Act for the encour-
agement of learning.”  1 Stat. at 124.  The patent statute was entitled, “An Act to promote
the progress of useful Arts.”  1 Stat. at 109; see also Patterson, supra note 31, at 367 n.6 R
(pointing out these different purposes and noting that courts often confuse them).
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expression.33  Copyright typically provides exclusive rights to
reproduce, distribute, display, and perform the work, as well as the
right to make derivative works,34 and it typically lasts for the life of the
author plus seventy years.35  By contrast, the current version of the
utility patent statute protects only useful, novel, and nonobvious in-
ventions, which, unlike copyrightable works, must undergo scrutiny by
the U.S. Patent Office before rights attach.36  The owner of a patent
has the exclusive rights to make, use, or sell products that include the
patented invention for a period of twenty years from the date of filing
the patent application.37
Copyright and patent law are supposed to embody “two hermeti-
cally sealed compartments,” each governing their specific subject mat-
ter in the appropriate fashion.38  Similarly, over the past two centuries,
judges and scholars have struggled both to explain the distinction be-
tween the regimes and to keep their respective contents separate.  Ex-
planations have highlighted a range of possibilities, including the
different values they promote and the economic and transaction costs
they create,39 as well as the different kinds of creativity responsible for
generating new works and inventions.40  Most of these explanations
help clarify some important differences between copyright and pat-
ent, but they also tend to ignore others.
At a fundamental level, both copyright and patent law intend to
improve the quality of life for citizens by promoting the creation of
33 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”); id. § 302(a)
(“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation . . . .”).
34 Id. § 106.
35 Id. § 302(a).  For works made for hire and anonymous and pseudononymous
works, protection lasts for 120 years from the date of creation or 95 years from the year of
publication, whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c).
36 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 111, 131 (2006).
37 Id. § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent there-
for, infringes the patent.”); id. § 154(a)(2) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title,
such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending
20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United
States or, if the application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application or
applications under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title, from the date on which the
earliest such application was filed.”).
38 See J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a
Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475,
480–81 (1995) (noting that many countries draw this distinction and that it is recognized
in international law).
39 See Masur & Fagundes, supra note 11, at 31–33. R
40 See generally Fromer, supra note 11, at 1483–1508. R
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valuable new works and inventions.41  The two regimes appear to have
divided the realm of valuable new products into two distinct catego-
ries.  Copyright law promotes the creation of aesthetic products—
those expressing ideas or emotions.42  Patent law, by contrast, pro-
motes useful products—those functioning to improve some aspect of
the quality of life.43  But even this initial distinction creates problems.
If aesthetic works improve the quality of life, why should they not be
considered “useful” and thus subject to the requirements of patent
law?44  At some level, all aesthetic products appear to serve some func-
tion; they instruct, inspire, or entertain us.  Conversely, many inven-
tions contain aesthetic components that produce pleasurable
emotions or feelings.  What is the difference between a painting that
“looks good” and a chair that “feels good”?
One way to view this problem is to focus on the different human
senses that copyrighted works and patented inventions address.  Copy-
right law has, in effect, bracketed off that class of products whose “use-
fulness” or function entails the creation of pleasures45 or sensations
perceived by sight and hearing.  As new media have emerged, those
appealing to sight and hearing have fallen into the domain of copy-
right.46  Accordingly, copyright protection exists for the visual expres-
sion of ideas and emotions in paintings, the aural expression of ideas
and emotions in musical compositions, and the combination of sen-
sory modalities in works of literature and film.47  Patent law is left to
41 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 18, at 1694 (“Patents and copyrights are created for an R
instrumental purpose that is directly related to the subject matter of protection: We want
more of the sort of works that patent and copyright law protect.”).
42 See Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copyright
Vis-a`-vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 204 (“[W]orks of author-
ship . . . invite and elicit dialogue about the ideas to which they give expressive form.”).
43 See id. at 215 (“[T]he question [in patent] is, ‘is this new,’ or, ‘is this something that
was previously unavailable to the public?’”).
44 See Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1105, 1114 (2008) (“Nevertheless, the aesthetic pleasure in a product is in and of
itself a utilitarian value, and hovers between objective, functional benefit and non-objec-
tive, personal sensory benefit.  Thus, the dichotomy between the two qualities, the func-
tional and the aesthetic, soon breaks down . . . .”).
45 For an interesting study of the law’s treatment of pleasure, see generally Susan
Reid, Sex, Drugs, and American Jurisprudence: The Medicalization of Pleasure, GENDER & SEXUAL-
ITY L. ONLINE, at 40–47 (2011), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/gslonline/files/2011/04/
Reid_Legal-Scholarship.pdf (describing ways in which litigants have challenged laws that
criminalize pleasure).
46 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (clarifying that copyright
extends to a number of newer forms of media).
47 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (providing a nonexclusive list of categories of works
of authorship including: “(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompany-
ing words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works”).
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govern products that appeal to the other senses of touch, taste, and
smell as well as those whose usefulness has no relation to the human
body (e.g., a new invention for storing data on a computer chip).  The
remainder of this Part establishes this assertion and explores the diffi-
culties IP law experiences when the senses escape their
compartments.
A. Copyrighting Sights and Sounds
In a recent article, Anne Barron has suggested that copyright law
borrows heavily from a tradition in aesthetic theory in which “the sep-
arate arts are distinguished from each other, and the essential compo-
nents of each art carefully dissected, for the purpose of identifying
their aesthetic limits and possibilities.”48  The goal of this approach is to
confine the various arts into exclusive categories to isolate their for-
mal characteristics and judge their respective achievements.  Much of
this work involves understanding the different senses the arts appeal
to and the way they are perceived.49
Vision has been the dominant sense in Western cultural history,50
and that dominance is evident in the early history of copyright law.
The first copyright statute, the Act of May 31, 1790, provided protec-
tion for only three classes of works—maps, charts, and books—all of
which are essentially visual media.51  Over the next century, other vis-
ual media were added to the list: “engravings, etchings, and prints
(1802); . . . photographs and negatives (1865); and paintings, draw-
ings, chromolithographs, statuary, and ‘models or designs intended to
be perfected as works of the fine arts’ (1870).”52
48 Anne Barron, Copyright Law and the Claims of Art, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 368, 370–71
(2002).  Barron follows the tradition from the eighteenth-century German critic Gotthold
Ephraim Lessing through Clement Greenberg and his followers in the twentieth century.
Although her arguments are specifically about the United Kingdom, they apply with simi-
lar force to U.S. copyright law.
49 See id. (“[T]hese efforts were oriented towards building an understanding of what is
specific to each art: an account of the differences between the types of ‘sign’ each art
employs (‘natural’ or ‘arbitrary’); the sensory apparatus involved in the perception of these
signs (e.g. sight, touch, hearing); and whether they are perceived in space or in time.”). See
generally W.J.T. MITCHELL, ICONOLOGY: IMAGE, TEXT, IDEOLOGY 116–49 (1986) (exploring
the claim that “the most fundamental difference between words and images would seem to
be the physical, ‘sensible’ boundary between the realms of visual and aural experience”).
50 See MARTIN JAY, DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH-CEN-
TURY FRENCH THOUGHT 21–81 (1993) (discussing the dominant role vision played from the
time of the ancient Greeks through the time of Descartes); see also Buccafusco, supra note
21, at 635 (discussing the links that Western society perceives between visual paradigms, on R
the one hand, and scientific discoveries and empirical inquiry, on the other).
51 Ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
52 See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 26 (3d
ed. 2010).
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The current copyright statute combines most visual media into a
category labeled “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”53  Copy-
right in these works extends to features that exhibit original and mini-
mally creative visual delineations or forms.54  For traditional visual arts
such as painting, these features can include the use of line, shade, and
color, as well as other aspects of the painter’s “style”55 to express ideas
or emotions.  For example, the court in Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. found protectable expression in the artist’s selection of
perspective, inclusion of visual details, and “sketchy, whimsical style”
in which those details were rendered.56  Describing the protectable
originality and creativity in a photographic portrait seems more diffi-
cult, however, because the photographer is limited by both the me-
dium and the subject.  Yet the U.S. Supreme Court had no trouble
describing the photographer’s protected expression in a famous pho-
tograph of Oscar Wilde.  It included the “visible form [created] by
posing [Wilde] in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the
costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph,
arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and
disposing the light and shade, [and] suggesting and evoking the de-
sired expression.”57  The combination of these features created a “har-
monious” visible form that was eligible for copyright protection.58
In 1831, Congress for the first time extended copyright protec-
tion to works appealing to the sense of hearing.59  Copyright in musi-
cal compositions extends to the original and creative use of rhythm,
harmony, and melody60 as well as any accompanying lyrics.61  The his-
tory of music exhibits the dominance of the sense of sight in copyright
law.  When copyright in musical compositions originated, the only
means of access to a composition were live performances and notated
sheet music.  The invention of player piano rolls around the turn of
the twentieth century, however, provided a new medium for recording
53 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006).  These works “include two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproduc-
tions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architec-
tural plans.” Id. § 101.
54 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (2010) (“In order to be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic
or sculptural work, the work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or
form.”).
55 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (discussing similarities of “style” between two drawings).
56 Id.
57 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
58 Id. at 60–61.
59 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436.
60 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 272 n.1 (6th Cir.
2009); Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
61 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006).
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and distributing compositions.62  Musicians, and especially music pub-
lishers, wanting to reap the economic benefits of the new medium,
sued the unlicensed producers of player piano rolls alleging that the
rolls infringed the publishers’ copyrights in the compositions.  In
1908, the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court.63  The issue before
the Court was whether the rolls met the statutory definition of “cop-
ies.”64  Justice Day noted, “When the combination of musical sounds is
reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by the au-
thor which is heard.”65  Nonetheless, he concluded, “These musical
tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye.  In no sense can musi-
cal sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be
copies as that term is generally understood . . . .”66  According to the
Court, a musical composition “is not susceptible of being copied until
it has been put in a form which others can see and read.”67  An En-
glish court had reached the same conclusion eight years earlier, hold-
ing that “[a] sheet of music is treated in the Copyright Act as if it were
a book or sheet of letterpress.”68  The court went so far as to suggest a
difference between “[t]he fundamental ideas underlying” the sheet
music and the music itself: “Music appeals to the ear, but a sheet of
music appeals to the eye . . . .”69  Thus, although copyright was based
on the creation of a “collocation” of sounds70 appealing to the ear,
protection of those sounds extended only to visibly intelligible copies.
This ruling has since been amended by statute,71 but it indicates the
value that copyright law places on the sensory qualities of works.
Painting and music appeal to single senses, but some works ap-
peal to a combination of sight and sound.  Consider, for example,
copyright law’s treatment of literary works and dramatic compositions,
both of which combine the two senses.  The first copyright statute in-
62 See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDIES: 26; THE UNAU-
THORIZED DUPLICATION OF SOUND RECORDINGS 3 (Comm. Print 1961) (primarily by Barbara
A. Ringer); Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 297–301
(2004).
63 See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1908).
64 See id. at 15–18.
65 Id. at 17.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Boosey v. Whight, [1900] 1 Ch. 122 at 123.  The Court wrote,
[Copyright] means that [holders] have the exclusive right of printing or
otherwise multiplying copies of those sheets of music—i.e., of the bars,
notes, and other printed words and signs on those sheets.  But [holders]
have no exclusive right to the production of the sounds indicated by or on
those sheets of music.
Id.
69 Id. at 124.
70 White-Smith Music Publ’g Co., 209 U.S. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring).
71 See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
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cluded books,72 and in many ways they are the paradigmatic example
of a copyrightable work.  Following the Supreme Court’s logic with
respect to sheet music, literary works would seem to appeal to the
sense of vision.  Certainly the eyes perceive the words themselves.
Even the stories told often communicate ideas by way of mental im-
agery that feels vaguely visual.73  Yet many literary works are prized for
the sonic quality of their diction and syntax.  Indeed, as Judge
Learned Hand noted, some literary works may not communicate any
ideas at all.74  According to Hand, such works pose no problem for
copyright law: “Conceivably there may arise a poet who strings to-
gether words without rational sequence—perhaps even coined sylla-
bles—through whose beauty, cadence, meter, and rhyme he may seek
to make poetry.”75  Just as music is copyrightable without being “repre-
sentative,” nonrepresentative literary works could be copyrightable if
they possess formal qualities that express emotion.
The protection afforded dramatic compositions raised similar is-
sues.  In the 1868 case of Daly v. Palmer, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant copied the “railway scene” from the plaintiff’s play.76  In
the scene (which has since been copied ad infinitum), one of the
characters is tied to a railway track in front of an oncoming locomo-
tive.77  The plaintiff claimed that, although the defendant copied
none of the plaintiff’s dialogue, the defendant had pirated the dra-
matic—and economic—heart of the work.78  The defendant, however,
argued that the protectable elements of a dramatic work extended
only to the dialogue between the characters (i.e., the auditory compo-
nents of the work).79  The court disagreed, explaining that dramatic
works can be multisensory:
Such a composition, when represented, excites emotions and im-
parts impressions not merely through the medium of the ear, as
music does, but through the medium of the eye as well as the ear.
Movement, gesture, and facial expression, which address the eye
only, are as much a part of the dramatic composition as is the spo-
ken language which addresses the ear only.80
In a later case, Justice Holmes offered a similar opinion: “[D]rama
may be achieved by action as well as by speech.  Action can tell a story,
72 See Act of May 13, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
73 On literary and other types of “images,” see MITCHELL, supra note 49, at 9–11. R
74 See Reiss v. Nat’l Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (“There
has of late been prose written, avowedly senseless, but designd [sic] by its sound alone to
produce an emotion.”).
75 Id.
76 See Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1132–33 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552).
77 Id. at 1133–34.
78 See id. at 1133–35.
79 See id. at 1133–36.
80 Id. at 1137.
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display all the most vivid relations between men, and depict every kind
of human emotion, without the aid of a word.”81
Throughout the twentieth century, the subject matter eligible for
copyright protection continued to expand.  Copyright law grew to in-
clude, for example, motion pictures, choreography, and architec-
ture.82  At least as a matter of the formal qualities of these media, new
visual and auditory media easily assimilated into the copyright regime.
B. Patenting Touch
In cordoning off products that appeal to sight and hearing, copy-
right law has left to patent law those that appeal to touch, taste, and
smell or that have no sensory reference to the human body.  Accord-
ingly, since its origins, patent law has focused on tangible products—
goods that could be held or touched.  The initial patent statute en-
acted in 1790 authorized patents for “any useful art, manufacture, en-
gine, machine, or device.”83  The latter four categories were
specifically focused on the invention of products of physical sub-
stance, and early patent cases often invalidated patents for a lack of
tactile engagement.84  Over the past two centuries, patentable subject
matter has expanded beyond the realm of eighteenth-century techno-
logical inventions, but the essential core of utility patent law remains
focused on tangible products.
Utility patents, as their name suggests, require utility.85  Although
the courts have not developed a sustained jurisprudence on utility,
inventions must provide “a new means of achieving a useful end or
result.”86  As one patent scholar notes, this requirement excludes dis-
coveries, however practical and useful, in the “nontechnological arts,
such as the liberal arts [and] social sciences.”87  What types of discov-
eries fall into the category of “nontechnological arts?”  New sympho-
nies and novels will not qualify for patent protection,88 but what about
discoveries that appeal to the senses of touch, taste, and smell?  Here,
the courts have found utility in products that generate tactile, gusta-
81 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911).
82 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
83 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
84 Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm,
51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 955 (2010).
85 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent there-
for . . . .”); see also Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1196–97
(“While ‘newness’ receives constant attention and debate, usefulness has been largely
ignored.”).
86 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01, at I-7 (2011).
87 Id.
88 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously,
85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1406 n.153 (2010).
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tory, and olfactory sensation.  Patents on “ergonomic” and “kines-
thetic” designs abound without any question about their usefulness.89
Similarly, Judge Richard Posner had no problem finding that a “sex
aid”—or as he preferred to call it, a “sexual device”—was useful.90
There is, however, no attempt to explain why tactile pleasure is “use-
ful” but visual or auditory pleasure is not.
One can appreciate the ease with which utility patent law con-
fronts appeals to touch, taste, and smell in patent law’s “definiteness”
jurisprudence.  Utility patent law requires that patent claims be suffi-
ciently definite for one skilled in the art to understand the nature and
scope of the claimed invention.91  This requirement ensures that
other inventors can understand the claims to either improve on the
invention or avoid infringing it.92  In many technological areas, a pat-
entee achieves definiteness by specifying the exact dimensions and
functions of a product using quantitative measurements and formu-
lae.93  If the patentee fails to disclose sufficient criteria, the patent will
be invalid.94
Ambiguous terms in patents are costly because they can make pat-
ents overbroad and unclear,95 and courts faced with ambiguous claims
are forced to either construe those terms more narrowly or invalidate
the patent entirely.  The latter will occur if the court determines that
the claims are “insolubly ambiguous.”96  This often occurs if the claims
involve “an inherently subjective concept.”97  Interestingly, patent
claims associated with the senses of touch and taste do not seem to
raise definiteness problems.  For example, a claim involving a rear
frame on a piece of yard equipment that was configured to allow the
operator to “comfortably reach and operate the control system” was
89 See, e.g., Ergonomic Mouse, U.S. Patent No. 7,304,636 (filed July 27, 2004); Kines-
thetic Ankle-Foot Orthosis, U.S. Patent No. 5,370,604 (filed Jan. 7, 1993).
90 See Ritchie v. Vast Res., Inc., 563 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Nevertheless . . .
the plaintiffs’ invention is useful . . . .”).
91 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . .
to make and use the same . . . .”).
92 See 3 CHISUM, supra note 86, § 8.03[3]; Christa J. Laser, A Definite Claim on Claim R
Indefiniteness: An Empirical Study of Definiteness Cases of the Past Decade with a Focus on the
Federal Circuit and the Insolubly Ambiguous Standard, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 25, 27–28
(2010).
93 See id. at 35–36 (noting that chemical and mechanical patent claims are upheld
more often than electrical claims and hypothesizing that this difference might arise be-
cause chemical and mechanical patents are described with precise technical language).
94 See 3 CHISUM, supra note 86, § 8.03. R
95 See Laser, supra note 92, at 29. R
96 See, e.g., Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249–50 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (describing the insolubly ambiguous standard and its policy rationale).
97 See Viskase Cos. v. World Pac Int’l AG, 714 F. Supp. 2d 878, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
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held not insolubly ambiguous.98  Similarly, courts have allowed other
terms dealing with touch or taste, including “smooth,”99 “extremely
soft,”100 “taste,”101 and “smoke flavor.”102  As discussed later, terms re-
ferring to the sense of sight create problems.
C. Deviants and Misfits
When the senses stay in their hermetically sealed containers—
sight and sound in the copyright container and touch, taste, and smell
in the patent container—IP law functions smoothly.  Cases in which
one sense breaks out of its appropriate container and invades the
other illustrate the point.  When this occurs, implicit assumptions be-
come apparent, and courts struggle mightily to keep things in their
rightful places.  The most confused and least satisfactory areas of IP
law—copyright’s useful articles doctrine and design patents—are ex-
amples of these deviants and misfits.103
1. Copyrighting Touch and Taste
Aesthetic creations do not always exist in a single media type.
The paradigmatic copyrightable works are products of pure aesthet-
ics—paintings, sculptures, and sonatas—whose forms are uncon-
strained by the banalities of utility or function.104  But cocktail shakers
can look like rocket ships, articles of clothing can include elaborate
designs, and cars can be both beautiful and aerodynamic.  Copyright
law categorizes cocktail shakers, clothes, and cars as “useful article[s]”
because they have “an intrinsic utilitarian function”—to mix cocktails,
cover the body, and provide transportation, respectively.105  Since cop-
yright law protects only the “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing in-
dependently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article,” once a court de-
98 See Toro Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 545 F. Supp. 2d 933, 938, 951–52 (D. Minn.
2008); see also Smartdisk Corp. v. Archos S.A., No. 2-05-CV-101, 2006 WL 3448645, *7 & n.8
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that the phrases “housing which can be comfortably held in a
user’s palm” and “housing of a size to be held in the palm of a user’s hand” in two patents’
claims were not too indefinite).
99 Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 450 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
100 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Micro Therapeutics, Inc., No. C03-05669, 2007 WL
734998, *18–20 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
101 Viskase Cos., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
102 Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Res., Civ. No. 05–00679, 2008 WL 4483774, *3–7
(D. Haw. 2008).
103 The terms “deviants” and “misfits” come from Reichman, supra note 38, at 504. R
104 See supra Part I.A.
105 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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termines an object is a useful article, it must determine whether its
aesthetic features are separable.106
To determine whether a work is a useful article in the first in-
stance, a court analyzes whether it has an “intrinsic utilitarian func-
tion.”107  The Copyright Act does not define utilitarian function, but it
explicitly excludes works that “merely . . . portray the appearance of
the article or . . . convey information.”108  Accordingly, a sculpture is
not a useful article even though it may “function” to provide visual
pleasure, signify the owner’s taste and status, or cover a hole in the
wall.109
Courts have been reluctant to call visual pleasure a utilitarian
function.  In Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., the court analyzed
whether a toy airplane was a useful article.110  The district court had
found the toy was a useful article—children need toys for growing up,
and the toy airplane “permits a child to dream and to let his or her
imagination soar.”111  The Sixth Circuit disagreed, likening the toy to
a painting: “To be sure, a toy airplane is to be played with and en-
joyed, but a painting of an airplane, which is copyrightable, is to be
looked at and enjoyed.  Other than the portrayal of a real airplane, a
toy airplane, like a painting, has no intrinsic utilitarian function.”112
According to the court, visual pleasure and its effect on the imagina-
tion are not utilitarian functions.  Holding otherwise would be to say
that “virtually any ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work’ would not
be copyrightable as a ‘useful article.’  A painting of Lindbergh’s Spirit
of St. Louis invites the viewer ‘to dream and to let his or her imagina-
tion soar,’ and would not be copyrightable under the district court’s
approach.”113  The court’s logic, in other words, is that if visual de-
lineation is functional, then works that are paradigmatically copyright-
able are also functional.  As in utility patent law, copyright law does
not define functionality or utility.  It does, however, make clear that
expression and representation are neither functional nor utilitarian.
106 Id. § 102(a)(5); see also id. § 101 (defining “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works”).  If the work is not a useful article to begin with, the work’s aesthetic features are
copyrightable.
107 See id. § 101.
108 Id.
109 See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.5.3.1(a)
(1989) (observing that “Section 101’s use of the adjective ‘intrinsic’ to modify the term
‘utilitarian function’ presumably excludes such marginally useful works” as a person using
a sculpture as a paperweight).
110 See Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 972–73 (6th Cir. 1983).
111 Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Mich. 1981), vacated,
703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983).
112 Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 972–73.
113 Id.
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If visual pleasure is not intrinsically utilitarian, is tactile pleasure?
In OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Oman, the designer of the KOOSH ball
filed suit when the Register of Copyrights denied his registration.114
The designer claimed that the ball’s visual character and tactile feel
merited copyright registration.115  The Register held that the ball was
a useful article because the plaintiff designed the ball so that children
could easily catch it.116  As to the ball’s visual character, the Register
found the ball “basically constituted a sphere” and was thus insuffi-
ciently original or creative.117  The Register further determined that
“an object’s tactility—the way it feels—is a functional part of the work
and therefore not copyrightable.”118  In support of his argument, the
plaintiff raised examples of museum programs that allow the blind to
enjoy sculptures’ tactile qualities.119  The district court disagreed and
upheld the Register’s denial.  The district court found that “the au-
thorship involved in designing the work so that it functions to pro-
duce a certain touch is essentially the design of a utilitarian aspect of
the work.  As such, this authorship is not copyrightable because of the
proscription in the law against protecting articles of utility.”120  The
judge thought the plaintiff’s argument that tactility is a form of copy-
rightable expression “proves too much, for, if it were correct, any ob-
ject may be copyrighted on the basis of its feel.”121
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the Register backed down from
the claim that “feel” or “tactile qualities” definitively could not form
the basis for copyright registration.122  Instead, it argued that the
ball’s tactile feel was inseparable from its function.123  The plaintiff
ultimately conceded the conceptual separability point, and then-Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg ruled that the Register had not abused its dis-
cretion by denying copyright protection.124
OddzOn Products suggests that feel equals function, and other
cases support this conclusion.  Garment designs are generally not
114 See CIV. A No. 89-0106, 1989 WL 214479, *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 1989), aff’d, 924 F.2d
346 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
115 See id. at *1–3.
116 See id. at *3.
117 See id. at *1.
118 Id.
119 Id. at *3.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 346, 349 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
123 See id.
124 See id. at 349–50.  On appeal, the plaintiff tried to argue that the KOOSH ball was
similar to the toy airplane in Gay Toys and thus should not be treated as a useful article. See
id. at 350.  The court ruled that it would not review this argument because it had not been
raised during the application process or in the district court. See id.
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copyrightable,125 while the designers of “comfortable” garments and
fabrics often successfully file for patent protection.126  Similarly, ergo-
nomic designs can receive utility patents, but copyright lays claim to
separable aesthetic components through the useful articles doc-
trine.127  Thus, while auditory and visual sensations are nonfunctional,
copyright law tends to treat tactile sensation as functional.128
This tendency is striking in light of the Copyright Act (the Act).
The current version of the Act protects original works of authorship
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later de-
veloped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or de-
vice.”129  Yet despite the Act’s reference to a work’s tangibility, copy-
rightable subject matter curiously excludes media that specifically rely
on the sense of touch to communicate.
Copyright law’s treatment of gustatory sensation closely tracks its
treatment of tactility.130  Recent attempts to secure copyright protec-
tion for recipes failed in part because authorities have treated the cre-
ation of gustatory sensations as functional.  According to leading
copyright authority Melville Nimmer, the notion that recipes can be
copyrighted “seems doubtful because the content of recipes are
clearly dictated by functional considerations, and therefore may be
said to lack the required element of originality, even though the com-
bination of ingredients contained in the recipes may be original in a
noncopyright sense.”131  In the most extensive discussion of the
copyrightability of recipes by any court, the Seventh Circuit in Meredith
Corp. relied on Nimmer’s analysis in vacating the district court’s find-
ing of infringement of a cookbook Discover Dannon.132  Although the
125 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellec-
tual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1699 (2006).
126 See, e.g., Ergonomically Engineered Underwear, U.S. Patent No. 5,157,793 (filed
Sept. 26, 1991); Soft Durable Nonwoven Fabric, U.S. Patent No. 2,823,142 (filed Oct. 20,
1954).
127 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“Design alternatives are further limited by the GUI’s purpose of making interaction be-
tween the user and the computer more ‘user-friendly.’  These, and similar environmental
and ergonomic factors which limit the range of possible expression in GUIs, properly in-
form the scope of copyright protection.”).
128 One wonders how copyright law would treat Aldous Huxley’s “Feelies.” See HUXLEY,
supra note 1. R
129 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
130 See Buccafusco, supra note 25, at 1127–30 (discussing lack of copyright protection R
for recipes). For a discussion of the copyrightability of smell, see generally Charles
Cronin, Genius in a Bottle: Perfume, Copyright, and Human Perception, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A., 427, 482–83 (2009), concluding that copyright protection should be limited to
works perceived through sight and hearing.
131 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[I] (2011)
(footnote omitted).
132 See Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481–82 (7th Cir. 1996).
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court withheld judgment on whether recipes are “per se amenable to
copyright protection,” it concluded:
The recipes involved in this case comprise the lists of required in-
gredients and the directions for combining them to achieve the fi-
nal products.  The recipes contain no expressive elaboration upon
either of these functional components, as opposed to recipes that
might spice up functional directives by weaving in creative
narrative.133
The court stated that dishes like “Curried Turkey and Peanut Salad”
and “Swiss ‘n’ Cheddar Cheeseball[s]” did not manifest “even a bare
modicum of the creative expression—that is, the originality—that is
the ‘sine qua non of copyright.’”134  Agreeing with Nimmer, the Sev-
enth Circuit in Meredith Corp. held that the recipes were either state-
ments of preexisting facts (i.e., “the ingredients necessary to the
preparation of a particular dish”) or procedures or processes, which
are excluded from copyright protection by section 102(b) of the Cop-
yright Act.135
Interestingly, the Meredith Corp. court did soften its ruling that
recipes are not copyrightable.  The court conceded that some por-
tions of recipes may be copyrightable to the extent that their “authors
lace their directions for producing dishes with musings about the spir-
itual nature of cooking or reminiscences they associate with the waft-
ing odors of certain dishes in various stages of preparation.”136  The
court effectively suggests that while gustatory expression is functional
and thus noncopyrightable, the inclusion of literary or visual expres-
sion in a recipe qualifies for protection.
2. Patenting Sight
Just as the pleasures of touch and taste are considered inappro-
priate for copyright law, visual pleasure can create problems for pat-
ent law.  While patent law embraces functionality, attempts to patent
visual pleasure trigger the same jurisprudential alarms that blare when
an author tries to copyright tactile pleasure.  In addition, patent law
has developed its own method for dealing with products that incorpo-
rate both visually pleasing and functional features—design patent law.
Commentators consider design patent law, like its copyright-law
cousin the useful articles doctrine, to be hopelessly confused.
133 Id. at 480.
134 Id. at 476, 482 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991)).  The court conflates the standards of originality and minimal creativity.  Copy-
rightable work must be original to the author (i.e., not copied) and demonstrate some
modicum of creative spark. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
135 See Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d at 480, 482.
136 Id. at 481.
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This confusion arises in large part from the law’s attempt to ana-
lyze visual sensation using doctrinal tools developed for issues associ-
ated with utility.  For example, Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.
involved alleged infringement of a patent for a program that allowed
a user to create “aesthetically pleasing” electronic-kiosk interfaces.137
The defendant argued that the patent claim was indefinite because
“aesthetically pleasing” did not provide sufficient notice of the
claimed invention’s scope.138  The plaintiff suggested that “aestheti-
cally pleasing” meant a claimed invention is only attractive to the per-
son using the product, but the Federal Circuit refused this
interpretation.139  The court noted that “aesthetically pleasing” meant
“having beauty that gives pleasure or enjoyment,” and the court was
concerned that different standards of beauty would lead to unre-
strained constructions of the claim’s scope.140  The Federal Circuit
wrote:
A purely subjective construction of “aesthetically pleasing” would
not notify the public of the patentee’s right to exclude since the
meaning of the claim language would depend on the unpredictable
vagaries of any one person’s opinion of the aesthetics of interface
screens.  While beauty is in the eye of the beholder, a claim term, to
be definite, requires an objective anchor.141
The plaintiff tried to provide an “objective anchor” by listing generally
accepted parameters of good design—including symmetry, consis-
tency, predictability, simplicity, and cleanliness—but the court found
little solace in these constraints.142  The parameters did not dictate
how symmetry or consistency should be evaluated or weighed to deter-
mine whether any given incarnation of a product would fall within the
patent’s scope.143  Accordingly, the court found the patent claim’s lan-
guage indefinite and declared the patent invalid.144
The court’s anxiety about the subjectivity of visual pleasure stands
in contrast to patent law’s acceptance of tactile and gustatory pleasure.
Patent courts do not usually find terms referring to touch or taste,
such as “comfortably” or “smoky flavor,” indefinite.  Such concepts,
however, seem no more amenable to mathematical precision than vis-
ual pleasure.
137 See 417 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
138 See id.
139 See id. at 1349–50.
140 See id. at 1348, 1350.
141 Id. at 1350.
142 See id. at 1353–54.
143 See id. at 1354.
144 See id. at 1356.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 24  9-MAR-12 13:40
524 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:501
Patent law most directly confronts the sense of sight in the field
of design patent law.145  Unlike utility patents, which protect useful
aspects of products and processes, design patents protect the orna-
mental designs of useful articles.146  As the Supreme Court explained
in 1871, the design patent statutes are “plainly intended to give en-
couragement to the decorative arts.  They contemplate not so much
utility as appearance, and that, not an abstract impression, or picture,
but an aspect given to those objects mentioned in the acts.”147  Design
patents aim to fill the gap between utility patents and copyrights.148
In fulfilling this intention, however, design patents have created con-
siderable confusion and unhappiness among courts and commenta-
tors.149  The anxiety that design patent law has generated seems to
come from patent judges’ discomfort with deciding questions of visual
aesthetics.
Congress first provided patent protection for designs in 1842.150
The act established a seven-year term of protection for “any new and
original design for a manufacture.”151  In Gorham Co., the Supreme
Court clarified that Congress aimed to encourage the creation of visu-
ally attractive articles of manufacture.152  The Court wrote: “The law
manifestly contemplates that giving certain new and original appear-
ances to a manufactured article may enhance its salable value, may
145 See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006) (“Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.”).
146 See 8 CHISUM, supra note 86, § 23.01. R
147 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (9 Wall.) 511, 524–25 (1871).
148 According to the Commissioner of Patents in 1902,
[T]he subject of design patents will occupy its proper philosophical posi-
tion in the field of intellectual production, having upon the one side of it
the statute providing protection to mechanical constructions, possessing
utility of mechanical function, and upon the other side the copyright law,
where objects of art are protected, reserving to itself the position of protect-
ing objects of new and artistic quality pertaining, however, to commerce,
but not justifying their existence upon functional utility.
WILLIAM L. SYMONS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 12 (1914).
149 See, e.g., 1 JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF PATENTS AND PATENT PRACTICE IN THE
PATENT OFFICE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS WITH RULES AND FORMS, § 58, at 108–09 (1911)
(“The protection of designs by Letters Patent is of very doubtful propriety.  The character-
istics of a patentable design always bring it, or should bring it, within the scope of the
copyright act.”); Perry J. Saidman, Functionality and Design Patent Validity and Infringement,
91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 313, 314 (2009) (“Confusion and uncertainty surround-
ing the issue of functionality has plagued design patent law for some time . . . .”).
150 Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44.  For a history of design
patent law, see generally Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of
the Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531 (2010) (reviewing the actions of early
commissioners and the Supreme Court in interpreting the design patent statute).
151 § 3, 5 Stat. at 543–44.  The Act specified various products that were eligible for
design patent protection, including metal materials, fabric designs, busts, statues, and
other ornaments attached to articles of manufacture. See id.
152 Gorham Co., 81 U.S. at 525.
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enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the
public.”153  Thus, when determining the patentability of an object,
patent examiners and courts should inquire not into the object’s util-
ity but rather its ability to confer visual pleasure.  The statute had in-
cluded the word “useful” in its description of design patent subject
matter, but this did not carry the same meaning as in the utility patent
sense.154  As the court in Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co. explained, “The
question an examiner asks himself while investigating a device for a
design patent is not ‘What will it do?’ but ‘How does it look?’  ‘What
new effect does it produce upon the eye?’  The term ‘useful,’ in rela-
tion to designs, means adaptation to producing pleasant emotions.”155
The court also noted, “Their object is to encourage works of art and
decoration which appeal to the eye, to the aesthetic emotions, to the
beautiful.”156
In 1902, Congress amended the design patent act to cover “any
new, original, and ornamental design” to make explicit the visual
character of design patent subject matter.157  Ornamentality now be-
came a subject-matter limitation on the availability of a design patent,
and it defined the patent’s scope.  Accordingly, courts increasingly
had to determine whether a given design was ornamental and
whether another design infringed its ornamental features.  In doing
so, courts generally followed Rowe’s suggestion to identify features that
appealed to the emotions or the aesthetic sense.  For example, in
1928, the D.C. Circuit noted that while people derive pleasure from
both useful and ornamental objects, the nature of that pleasure is
different:
A thing may be useful and ornamental, and may please, both be-
cause of the purpose for which it was made and because of its
beauty.  That which is utilitarian, however, pleases because it meets
the approval of reason, while that which is ornamental gratifies the
senses, without reasoning out the why or the wherefore.158
The court subsequently held that the plaintiff’s rivet-setting machine
was “lacking in symmetry, wanting in grace, and destitute of any ap-
peal to the senses or emotions,” and thus unpatentable.159  To appeal
153 Id.
154 See 8 CHISUM, supra note 86, § 23.02. R
155 Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co., 112 F. 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1901) (quoting Rowe v. Blodg-
ett & Clapp Co., 103 F. 873, 874 (D. Conn. 1900)).
156 Id.
157 Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193, 193; see SYMONS, supra note 148, at 13–14. R
158 In re Stimpson, 24 F.2d 1012, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
159 Id.; see also Bliss v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1963) (“Plain-
tiff’s pitcher has no particularly aesthetic appeal in line, form, color, or otherwise.  It con-
tained no dominant artistic motif either in detail or in its overall conception. . . .  The
reaction which the pitcher inspires is simply that of the usual, useful and not unattractive
piece of kitchenware.”); Design, Inc. v. Emerson Co., 319 F. Supp. 8, 11 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
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to the aesthetic sense or the emotions of a viewer, however, an object
need not belong to the fine arts.  According to one court, Congress
“had in mind the elimination of much of the unsightly repulsiveness
that characterizes many machines and mechanical devices which have
a tendency to depress rather than excite the esthetic sense.”160  Ac-
cordingly, the court found the design of a cement mixer to be a po-
tentially appropriate subject for a design patent.161
Throughout the better part of the twentieth century, courts in
design patent cases routinely scrutinized products for any indication
that their design appealed to the eye or excited the aesthetic senses or
emotions.162  In the last decade of the century, however, courts appear
to have gotten increasingly uncomfortable with the “largely subjective”
nature of these inquiries.163  In 1989, the Supreme Court declared
that, to qualify for design protection, “a design must present an aes-
thetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone,
and must satisfy the other criteria of patentability.”164  Over the next
several years, courts relied on this definition, but only selectively.
Rather than specifically examining the aesthetic merits of a design,
courts focused on lack of functionality as a proxy for aesthetic
merit.165  Thus, one court has noted that “[w]hen there are several
ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design
of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental pur-
pose.”166  Judge Pauline Newman was explicit about the reason for the
change: “Recognizing that ornamentation is in the eye of the be-
holder, the courts have sought a more objective standard in the gen-
eral rule that a design is ‘ornamental’ for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 171
when it is not primarily functional.”167
(“There is nothing either artistic or aesthetic about it.  One who sees it does not take
delight in its creation.”).
160 In re Koehring, 17 C.C.P.A. 774, 776 (1930).
161 Id. at 779.
162 See, e.g., Flexible Plastics Corp. v. Black Mountain Spring Water Inc., 357 F. Supp.
554, 555–56 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (“It is perhaps an understatement to say that it is not a thing
of beauty—it has not the slightest appeal to the aesthetic sense.”).
163 See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 299
(9th Cir. 1970) (rejecting potential design patent on the grounds that the design was obvi-
ous within the meaning of patent law).
164 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989).
165 See Perry J. Saidman & John M. Hintz, The Doctrine of Functionality in Design Patent
Cases, 19 U. BALT. L. Rev. 352, 352 (1989) (“The term ‘functionality’ is not used in the
patent statute with respect to designs.  Nevertheless, courts have read into the statute the
requirement that designs be nonfunctional as the converse of the statutory requirement of
ornamentality.”).
166 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
167 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (New-
man, J., dissenting); see also Saidman, supra note 149, at 317 (“If the function of the overall R
claimed design can be performed by other designs, then the design patent ipso facto is not
monopolizing that function and the claimed design is not de jure functional.”).
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Interestingly, the analytical change in design patent doctrine co-
incides fairly closely with the creation in 1982 of the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals as a specialist, quasi-technical court to hear patent
appeals.  Perhaps these technophile judges are particularly anxious
about the “subjective” nature of visual pleasure.  This change is poten-
tially problematic.  The existence of alternative designs does not nec-
essarily mean that any given alternative is ornamental.  In its anxiety
about visual aesthetics, the Federal Circuit has effectively read out of
the statute any affirmative requirement that the patentee’s design con-
tain aesthetic ornamental features.
*****
This Part has argued that IP law establishes a dichotomy in its
treatment of the human senses.  Copyright law has isolated works ap-
pealing to the senses of sight and hearing as its unique province, leav-
ing patent law with products that appeal to touch, taste, and smell as
well as other material and useful arts.  This account helps resolve am-
biguities in IP doctrine.  Copyright’s treatment of paintings as non-
functional and KOOSH balls and food as functional is explicable in
light of the different senses to which those works appeal.  Similarly,
the courts’ differential anxiety about the subjectivity of visual pleasure
compared with tactile or gustatory pleasure is consistent with the
claim that the latter two seem more appropriate for patent law’s sen-
sory “container.”
II
THE SENSORY DICHOTOMY AS HIERARCHY
Perhaps the most profound and lasting contribution of the criti-
cal movement in humanities and social sciences scholarship is the rec-
ognition that differences almost invariably lead to hierarchies.168
Where society makes distinctions between two classes of people, ob-
jects, or ideas, it will view one of them as better, nobler, or purer than
the other.  In more familiar terms, separate is never equal.  Recent
research on the history of aesthetic theory has shown this to be the
case for the senses as well.  From the ancient Greeks to modernist art
critics, authorities have uniformly ranked sight and hearing above
touch, taste, and smell.
Traditionally, scholars view sight and hearing as “high” senses
and touch, taste, and smell as “low” senses.169  While the high senses
are capable of artistic expression, the low senses are confined to mere
utility.  Accordingly, the pleasures of the high senses are nonfunc-
168 See FOUCAULT, supra note 20, at 145; JORDAN, supra note 20, at 253. R
169 See infra Part II.A.
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tional and may exhibit unconstrained expression.  The low senses,
constrained by functional necessity, tend to be limited by natural and
biological predispositions, while the pleasures of the high senses will
ultimately take different forms in different cultures.
In different contexts, Alfred Yen and Anne Barron have shown
that copyright doctrine closely tracks major aesthetic theories.170  This
Part argues that this view holds true for IP’s treatment of the senses as
well.  Explicitly or implicitly, IP law mimics the sensory hierarchy of
Western aesthetic theory.  Moreover, this hierarchy has been made to
justify the doctrinal distinction separating visual and auditory pleasure
from tactile, gustatory, and olfactory pleasure.
A. The Sensory Hierarchy in Aesthetic Theory
Since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers, sight and
sound have been distinguished from touch, taste, and smell on many
grounds, and in each case sight and sound have been found to involve
better, nobler, and purer experiences.  Philosophers have used a num-
ber of related and overlapping distinctions between the high and low
senses to justify this hierarchy.
The earliest criticisms of the low senses involved their seemingly
intimate relationship with bodily needs and desires.  For Kant, aes-
thetic experience required disinterested contemplation of beauty, but
the low senses were inherently interested in the survival of the individ-
ual.171  Unlike sight and sound, which could remain detached from
“practical biological interests,” Kant could not trust that touch, taste,
and smell could care about anything other than the essential needs of
the organism.172  Thus, the low senses could not divorce themselves
from mundane tasks for long enough to cultivate them.
170 See Barron, supra note 48, at 370–71 (“[T]here are clear affinities between the way R
U.K. copyright law dissects the genus ‘work’ for the purpose of delineating the possible
objects of a property right, and a tradition of thinking about the arts . . . in which the
separate arts are distinguished from each other, and the essential components of each art
carefully dissected, for the purpose of identifying their aesthetic limits and possibilities.”);
Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 250 (1998)
(“[T]he analytical premises of copyright opinions are practically identical to those of major
aesthetic theories.”).
171 See Nancy E. Aiken, An Evolutionary Perspective on the Nature of Art, 2 BULL. PSYCHOL.
& ARTS 3, 4 (2001) (“In Kant’s effort to sort out the components of aesthetic response, he
noted that this pleasure which art evokes does not seem to have anything to do with any
interest in the objects depicted in paintings. . . .  Kant called this aspect of aesthetic re-
sponse ‘disinterest’ which his followers construed to mean that since art does not interest
people for any utilitarian reason, it must have not [sic] utilitarian value.”).
172 See Frances W. Herring, Touch—The Neglected Sense: An Inquiry into the Reasons for Our
Comparative Failure to Create and Enjoy Tactile Art Forms, 7 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 199,
200 (1949) (quoting IRWIN EDMAN, THE WORLD, THE ARTS AND THE ARTIST 24 (1928)); see
also DUTTON, supra note 22, at 104 (“The opposite of disinterested contemplation for Kant R
occurs when we have an interest in the existence of an object of experience, particularly
when the pleasure we receive from the object satisfies a personal desire.  In order for us to
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Not only were the low senses incapable of disinterested apprecia-
tion of aesthetic beauty, they were also inferior with respect to the
formal principles upon which aesthetic experience is based.  Visual
and aural stimuli are external to the body, allowing multiple people
simultaneous access to them.  For the low senses to interact with stim-
uli, however, the stimuli need to be in more or less direct contact with
the body.  Accordingly, the experiences of the low senses were inher-
ently private and incommunicable.173  Moreover, the low senses
seemed to lack the degree of discrimination necessary for aesthetic
experience.174  Sight and sound exhibit natural principles for organiz-
ing communication based on line, color, scale, and tone.  Touch,
taste, and smell were thought to lack such principles, thereby elimi-
nating the possibility of communicating deep cultural meaning
through them.
B. The Sensory Hierarchy in IP Doctrine
IP’s sensory dichotomy mimics the hierarchy of the senses that
has dominated the Western aesthetic tradition for two millennia.  Oc-
casionally explicitly but more often implicitly, IP law distinguishes be-
tween the high senses and the low senses with regard to their capacity
for aesthetics, their functionality, their constraints, and their subjectiv-
ity.  This hierarchy legitimates IP law’s differential treatment of the
high and low senses: because touch, taste, and smell are nonaesthetic,
functional, and constrained, they do not merit copyright protection.
Perhaps the most obvious distinction between copyright and pat-
ent law is the divide between the aesthetic and the utilitarian.175  Cop-
yright law reflects the modernist notion that beauty is superfluous and
that art should be made solely for art’s sake.176  We enjoy visual and
take pleasure in a meal, his argument goes, the food must actually exist and assuage our
actual hunger.  Imagined food will never satisfy a real hunger.”).
173 See Herring, supra note 172, at 201. R
174 See id.
175 This contrast is also apparent in the distinction between design and utility patent
law. See In re Stimpson, 24 F.2d 1012, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (“A thing may be useful and
ornamental, and may please, both because of the purpose for which it was made and be-
cause of its beauty.  That which is utilitarian, however, pleases because it meets the ap-
proval of reason, while that which is ornamental gratifies the senses, without reasoning out
the why or the wherefore.”).
176 See Afori, supra note 44, at 1110–11 (“In the twentieth century there were further R
developments in conceptualizing designs, as art and industry merged, and the designer
began to be seen as an artist in his own right.  In response, social definitions strengthened
the differentiation between implicitly lower-class artisans and implicitly upper-class artists,
with the former in charge of utility and the latter in control of beauty, or art for art’s sake.
Oscar Wilde captured this insight by stating: ‘[a]ll art is quite useless.’”); Aiken, supra note
171, at 3 (“Historically, most aestheticians have regarded art as superfluous, as icing on the R
cake of culture.”); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1153.
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aural stimuli merely for the pleasure involved in contemplating the
beautiful and sublime.  Touch, taste, and smell, however, respond
only to the functional requirements of the body.  Their satisfaction is
only useful, never aesthetic.  Accordingly, they are appropriate for pat-
ent protection.
The distinction between the aesthetic and utilitarian is most ap-
parent in copyright law’s treatment of useful articles, especially those
that include appeals to the senses of touch, taste, and smell.  In cases
like OddzOn Products and Meredith Corp., the courts treated the tactile
feel of the KOOSH ball and the taste of dishes as functional compo-
nents of the works, which must be separable from any aesthetic fea-
tures before copyright protection attaches.177  By contrast, in Gay Toys
the court explicitly distinguished the visual pleasure of contemplating
a painting from the intrinsic utilitarian function of industrial prod-
ucts, writing, “Other than the portrayal of a real airplane, a toy air-
plane, like a painting, has no intrinsic utilitarian function.”178  The
court denied the argument that viewing a toy or painting could func-
tion to inspire the viewer’s imagination.179  This implies that, unlike
tactile or gustatory pleasure, visual pleasure is per se nonfunctional.
The functionality of tactile pleasure in IP doctrine is implicit in
Judge Posner’s treatment of the sex aids in Ritchie.180  Judge Posner
noted that the plaintiff’s products are “colloquially referred to as ‘sex
toys,’” but he resisted this characterization.181  Judge Posner preferred
the “more perspicuous term . . . ’sexual devices,’ by analogy to ‘medi-
cal devices.’”182  The analogy is telling: by its implied logic, sexual de-
vices, like medical devices, are useful and thus patentable.  They
manipulate the body in certain useful ways.  This rhetorical move
helps elide the pleasurable characteristics of the products.  Moreover,
had Judge Posner characterized the products as sex toys, the rule in
Gay Toys that toys are not useful articles would have been relevant.183
By characterizing them as sexual devices, the opinion implicitly distin-
guishes between the functional, tactile pleasure of sex aids and the
aesthetic visual pleasure of traditional toys.
The low senses are constrained by the objective, biological
properties of humans because they must meet the functional demands
177 See Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996); OddzOn
Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
178 Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2006) (defining a useful article as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information”).
179 See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973.
180 Ritchie v. Vast Res., Inc., 563 F.3d 1334, 1336–38 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
181 See id. at 1335.
182 Id.
183 See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973.
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of the body.  The pleasures of the high senses, by contrast, need not
comply with such limitations.  Accordingly, they are unconstrained
and subjective, allowing the free expression of culture.184  The rela-
tionship between constraint and function is evident in copyright law’s
separability analysis.  Courts faced with the task of separating the aes-
thetic from the functional often turn to the existence of constraints
on the designer on the assumption that, unlike functional features,
aesthetic features of a product are unconstrained.185  In addition, cop-
yright law embraces the subjectivity of aesthetics, often asking jurors
to judge the “aesthetic appeal”186 of a work’s “total concept and
feel.”187  As Datamize demonstrates, utility patent law excludes the sub-
jectivity of visual aesthetics and requires the existence of “[s]ome ob-
jective standard” within which the work can be constrained.188
Moreover, design patent jurisprudence has essentially reduced the dis-
tinction between aesthetic and functional design into a question
about constraints on the designer.  If the designer has choices, they
are deemed aesthetic.189
These examples illustrate the role the sensory hierarchy plays in
distinguishing copyrightable and patentable subject matter.  IP law re-
capitulates the qualitative distinction between the high senses and low
senses with respect to their aesthetic capacities and limitations.  Ap-
peals to the senses of touch, taste, and smell are excluded from copy-
right protection because they are merely functional and nonaesthetic.
III
CHALLENGING THE SENSORY DICHOTOMY
Like much in the history of philosophy, the sensory hierarchy
does not necessarily reflect fundamental truths about the capacities of
the senses for aesthetic experience.  Fortunately, recent research in
the social sciences sheds new light on this issue.  The qualitative dis-
tinction between the high and low senses cannot be maintained.  Vis-
184 See DUTTON, supra note 22, at 204 (“Culture, however, was completely different.  It R
was a realm of free creativity that engraved itself on a mental blank slate: culture was the
uncontested domain of the humanities, untouched by biology.”).
185 See, e.g., Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931–32 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no evidence that Heerlein’s artistic judgment was constrained by
functional considerations.”).
186 See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272–73 (2d Cir. 2001).
187 See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (deciding a
motion for summary judgment based on whether the jury would reasonably be able to
make a “subjective comparison” about whether two works were “substantially similar
in . . . ‘total concept and feel’”) (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16
F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)).
188 See Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
189 For more on functionality in design patent law, see supra notes 164–67 and accom- R
panying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 32  9-MAR-12 13:40
532 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:501
ual and aural expression are not as nonfunctional and unconstrained
as previously thought, nor are touch, taste, or smell as devoid of ex-
pressive capacity.  Developments in the emerging field of evolutionary
aesthetics are tapping into capacities and limits of the aesthetic expe-
rience.  Also, developments in haptic technology and studies of cui-
sine show how the low senses are capable of expressing ideas and
emotions in many of the same ways as the high senses.  This Part re-
views this research.
A. The Limits of the “High” Senses
The claims that the pleasures of the high senses are nonfunc-
tional and unconstrained are the principal distinctions that justify the
sensory hierarchy.  Therefore, art exists solely for art’s sake, and it will
take whatever form a given culture imposes on it.  Scholars in the
emerging field of evolutionary aesthetics are beginning to undermine
the strong form of both of these claims.  For example, some aesthetic
preferences are the result of evolutionary forces that favored humans
with such preferences.  Moreover, evolution had to select those prefer-
ences that promoted fitness in the environment in which early
humans evolved.
Evolutionary aesthetics, and evolutionary psychology more
broadly, starts with the recognition that the mind is a system designed
by natural selection to solve the kinds of problems that confronted
our prehistoric ancestors in the Pleistocene era (2.5 million to 12,000
years ago).190  Just as the physical features of organisms have evolved
through millennia of natural selection, so have aspects of the mind.
Features of the human mind that conferred survival advantages on
individuals exhibiting them were selected for and would tend to ap-
pear in higher proportion in subsequent generations.  In the same
way that walking upright increased the likelihood that those individu-
als would survive, so did an ability to visually recognize the pattern of a
potentially deadly snake.
While the scientific community overwhelmingly accepts that phys-
ical features of the human body have evolved, the notion that aspects
of the mind—and especially aesthetic preferences—have evolutionary
histories has received less resounding support.  While aesthetic prefer-
ences seem to be the preserve of unconstrained cultural expression,
new research suggests that our attraction to Britney Spears and Vin-
cent Van Gogh may have as much to do with evolution as our prefer-
ences for bacon and chocolate cake.191  As two of the leading
evolutionary psychologists write, “the human mind is permeated by an
190 See STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 21 (1997).
191 David Hume suggested as much in the eighteenth century: “Sweet and bitter,
Hume continues, are ‘bodily tastes’ that refer to subjective experience.  In this they are
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additional layer of adaptations that were selected to involve humans in
aesthetic experiences and imagined worlds, even though these activi-
ties superficially appear to be nonfunctional and even extravagantly
nonutilitarian.”192  This is not to deny any role for culture in shaping
our aesthetic preferences, but culture cannot give us a preference for
just anything.  According to Denis Dutton, “Human nature, so evolu-
tionary aesthetics insists, sets limits on what culture and the arts can
accomplish with the human personality and its tastes.”193
Understanding the principle that natural selection has shaped
some of our aesthetic preferences is one thing; determining which of
those preferences exhibit the stamp of evolution is quite another.
Culture is powerful, and it has obscured many features of our evolu-
tionary history.  To control for the effects of culture, evolutionary psy-
chologists look for evidence that a behavior is more or less universal
among humans, stereotyped within the species, and detectable in sub-
jects that have not been exposed to cultural influences (usually infants
and children).194  These techniques reveal aesthetic preferences that
bear the hallmarks of natural selection.  As Donald Symons writes,
“Beauty [i]s in the [a]daptations of the [b]eholder.”195
1. Vision
Studies of humans’ visual preferences suggest that some aspects
of the things pleasing to the eye are the products of evolutionary ad-
aptations that enhanced the survival of our ancestors’ genes.196  For
the great expanse of human prehistory, our species lived in savannas
characterized by grasslands and low trees.  Accordingly, evolutionary
aesthetics would predict that humans may have evolved preferences
for the visual features of high quality savanna landscape that promise
the richest resources in terms of food, water, and shelter.197  The re-
sults of various experiments support this hypothesis.  In one crosscul-
tural study, people from different countries viewed photographs of
various kinds of trees.  Regardless of the trees native to their home-
land, they consistently preferred broad, spreading trees with trunks
qualities not unlike the ‘mental tastes’ of beauty and ugliness.” DUTTON, supra note 22, at R
37.
192 See John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds? Toward an Evolu-
tionary Theory of Aesthetics, Fiction and the Arts, 94/95 SUBSTANCE 6, 11 (2001).
193 DUTTON, supra note 22, at 206. R
194 See Aiken, supra note 171, at 4. R
195 Donald Symons, Beauty Is in the Adaptations of the Beholder: The Evolutionary Psychology
of Human Female Sexual Attractiveness, in SEXUAL NATURE SEXUAL CULTURE 80, 80 (Paul R.
Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton eds., 1995).
196 See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 405
(2002).
197 See Gordon H. Orians, An Evolutionary Perspective on Aesthetics, 2 BULL. PSYCHOL. &
ARTS 25, 27 (2001).
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that bifurcate close to the ground over conical or columnar trees.
The investigators suggest that this preference reflects the kinds of
trees in the African savanna that provided the highest-quality
resources.198
Another study surveyed people in different countries around the
world about their preferences for visual art.199  The survey asked for
the kinds of paintings the participants liked to look at and their favor-
ite colors, subjects, and styles of painting.  It also asked what kinds of
things participants did not enjoy seeing.  If the strong cultural model
of aesthetic preferences were correct, the desires of people should di-
verge considerably and reflect their different cultures.  In fact, the
crosscultural similarity was overwhelming.  According to Dutton:
People in almost all nations disliked abstract designs, especially jag-
ged shapes created with a thick impasto in the commonly despised
colors of gold, orange, yellow, and teal.  This cross-cultural similarity
of negative opinion was matched on the positive side by another
remarkable uniformity of sentiment: almost without exception, the
most-wanted painting was a landscape with water, people, and
animals.200
The highest color preferences were for blue and green.  These prefer-
ences match what evolutionary aesthetics would predict: people get
the most pleasure out of images that mimic environmental features
such as food, water, and shelter, which provide survival advantages.
Similar findings emerge with respect to preferences for the physi-
cal beauty of people.  Crosscultural studies exhibit surprisingly high
correlations in interpersonal ratings of facial attractiveness.201  Re-
searchers also argue that people consistently prefer symmetrical faces
that are free of blemishes.202  Moreover, even six-month-old infants
can distinguish attractive from unattractive faces, and they prefer at-
tractive faces of diverse types.203  The preferred features are thought
to signify potential mates’ genetic qualities, because asymmetries and
blemishes are related to genetic disorders.
198 See id. at 27–28; see also DUTTON, supra note 22, at 22 (describing a study showing R
people of different ages photos of different landscapes in which “[t]he most striking find-
ing was in the youngest group: eight-year-olds preferred savannas for both living and visit-
ing above all the other age groups”).
199 See DUTTON, supra note 22, at 13. R
200 Id. at 14.
201 See Judith H. Langlois et al., Facial Diversity and Infant Preferences for Attractive Faces,
27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 79, 82 (1991).
202 See Symons, supra note 195, at 81, 97. R
203 Langlois et al., supra note 201, at 82. R
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2. Music
Music does not typically refer to or represent objects in the world,
and it ostensibly has no utilitarian value.  Accordingly, it seems to of-
fer the ideal medium for unconstrained cultural expression.204  None-
theless, research on infants’ musical preferences suggests that the
effects of evolution may determine some features of the world’s musi-
cal systems.  For example, a number of studies have shown that infants
exhibit preferences for consonance over dissonance and for simple
frequency ratios of tones well before the first birthday.205  Scientists
speculate that these preferences may reflect the ease with which con-
sonance is processed mentally and the similarity of simple frequency
ratios to the structure of human speech.206  According to Sandra
Trehub, these and similar studies “imply that infants are universalists
in the sense that they are perceptually equipped for the music of any
culture.  The cultural relativism and skepticism about musical univer-
sals that prevailed for several years among ethnomusicologists is un-
dergoing considerable change.”207
3. Narrative
Literary works also seem to exhibit characteristics that suggest the
influence of evolved preferences.  Throughout history and across cul-
tures, people tell stories,208 and those stories share strong resem-
blances in form and content.  The resemblances suggest that both the
structure and content of narratives reflect adaptive advantages passed
down through the generations.  For example, stories help organize
204 According to two researchers, “the prevailing view is that the special status of tones
related by simple frequency ratios stems largely from exposure to a particular musical cul-
ture or style and is, therefore, a reflection of musical consonance.”  E. Glenn Schellenberg
& Sandra E. Trehub, Natural Musical Intervals: Evidence from Infant Listeners, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI.
272, 272 (1996) (citations omitted).
205 See Laurel J. Trainor & Becky M. Heinmiller, The Development of Evaluative Responses
to Music: Infants Prefer to Listen to Consonance Over Dissonance, 21 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 77, 85
(1998); Schellenberg & Trehub, supra note 204, at 276. R
206 See Schellenberg & Trehub, supra note 204, at 276. R
207 Sandra E. Trehub, The Developmental Origins of Musicality, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
669, 670 (2003).  At least one court has recognized that some musical compositions are
more generally pleasing while others are not.  According to Judge Learned Hand, “It must
be remembered that, while there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the
musical notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile
demands of the popular ear.”  Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80, 80 (2d. Cir.
1940).
208 See Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 192, at 7 (“Involvement in fictional, imagined R
worlds appears to be a cross-culturally universal, species-typical phenomenon.”) (emphasis
omitted).  In addition, all normally developing humans acquire the ability to process and
generate stories.  Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, Narrative Theory and Function: Why Evolution
Matters, 25 PHIL. & LITERATURE 233, 234 (2001).
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information and share social norms.209  Embodying information and
norms in narrative makes them easier to process.  As John Tooby and
Leda Cosmides write, “stories are told in a way that mimics the format
in which experienced events are mentally represented and stored in
memory, in order to make them acceptable to the machinery the
mind uses to extract meaning from experience.”210  The basic narra-
tive structure of a chain of events in cause-and-effect relationships is
likely easy to remember and use.211
In addition, the stories that people tell tend to be highly consis-
tent despite different cultural contexts.  One writer has studied narra-
tives drawn from folktales of preliterate tribes, early epic poetry,
novels, operas, and movies and has isolated seven plot templates that
fit almost all stories.212  As Steven Pinker suggests, fictional narratives
provide us with a mental catalogue of the problems we are likely to
face and the strategies that we could deploy.213  Narratives simulate
basic human goals and encode valuable environmental information
about how to achieve them.214  Thus, the ability to share stories would
have provided adaptive advantages to individuals, enabling them to
cope with typical human conflicts over love, power, and nature.215
*****
The traditional account of the aesthetic potential of the human
senses insists that only sight and sound are capable of true artistic ex-
pression because unlike touch, taste, and smell, they may accommo-
date the unconstrained expression of cultural ideas and emotions.
The low senses, on the other hand, are too dependent on natural,
biological drives and dispositions to enable the free and disinterested
expression that characterizes the high senses.  Evolutionary aesthetics
has undermined the idea that the pleasures of sight and sound are
nonfunctional and unconstrained.  Many human visual and auditory
preferences appear to serve evolutionary ends and are limited by
evolved tendencies.  This is not to suggest that culture plays no role in
shaping visual and auditory pleasures.  Rather, it implies that this as-
pect of the sensory hierarchy is incorrect.  Our preferences for sights
and sounds are not meaningfully more nonfunctional or uncon-
209 See Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, On the Origins of Narrative: Storyteller Bias as a Fitness-
Enhancing Strategy, 7 No. 4 HUM. NATURE 403, 412 (1996) (“Like gossip, stories are rich in
social information: like gossiping, storytelling might have originated as an opportunistic
response to the human need for social information.”).
210 Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 192, at 24. R
211 See Sugiyama, supra note 208, at 234. R
212 See DUTTON, supra note 22, at 127. R
213 See PINKER, supra note 190, at 543. R
214 See Sugiyama, supra note 208, at 239. R
215 See DUTTON, supra note 22, at 118. R
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strained than our preferences for a soft touch, a bite of cheeseburger,
or the smell of bacon.
B. The Expressive Capacities of the “Low” Senses
1. Tactile Communication
As new research suggests the aesthetic limitations of the high
senses, research on the sense of touch begins to show its capacity for
intellectual and emotional communication.216  Touch is the most de-
veloped sense at birth,217 and the skin and its receptors make up the
largest of our sensory organs.218  Yet despite its importance to our in-
ter- and intrapersonal lives, behavioral researchers have largely ne-
glected touch.219  This may be due in large part to the lack of a critical
language for describing tactile sensations.  Although we easily recog-
nize the feelings associated with a loving caress or the twirl of dance,
communicating these feelings to others linguistically can be diffi-
cult.220  Advances in cultural anthropology and haptic technology are
beginning to overcome these difficulties.  Before describing this re-
search, it is worth pointing out that although we tend to speak of
“touch” as a single sense, it actually includes a number of distinct
physical sensations, including tactility, muscular tension, movement,
balance, temperature, and pain.221
One indication of the value we place on touch is the pervasive-
ness of tactile metaphors in linguistic communication.  For example,
we might describe someone as “coarse,” “smooth,” or “hard as nails,”
or we might speak of “weighty matters.”222  These tactile metaphors
even extend into our way of speaking about aesthetic experience.  A
painting may be “balanced,” and a good symphony declared “tight,”
while a bad one “plodding.”  Such phraseology provides emotional
color for our language.  In fact, emotions are described as “feelings”
regardless of which sense they come from.  Moreover, tactile meta-
phors may reflect fundamental structures of our mental architec-
ture—an architecture in which early sensorimotor experiences
216 Cf. DAVID HOWES, SENSUAL RELATIONS: ENGAGING THE SENSES IN CULTURE AND SO-
CIAL THEORY, at xii (2003) (“In the last few decades there has occurred a remarkable flores-
cence of theoretically engaged (and engaging) work on the senses in a wide range of
disciplines: from history and philosophy to geography and sociology, and from law and
medicine to literature and art criticism.”).
217 Matthew J. Hertenstein et al., Touch Communicates Distinct Emotions, 6 EMOTION 528,
528 (2006); Gallace & Spence, supra note 14, at 246. R
218 Gallace & Spence, supra note 14, at 246. R
219 See Joshua M. Ackerman et al., Incidental Haptic Sensations Influence Social Judgments
and Decisions, 328 SCIENCE 1712, 1712 (2010).
220 See Mark Paterson, Haptic Geographies: Ethnography, Haptic Knowledges and Sensous Dis-
positions, 33 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 766, 766 (2009).
221 Id. at 768.
222 See Ackerman et al., supra note 219, at 1713. R
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generate a cognitive scaffold for organizing future conceptual knowl-
edge and experience.223
In one recent experiment, scientists showed that unconscious tac-
tile experiences can spill over into cognitive judgments and behav-
iors.224  The researchers asked subjects to read a job applicant’s
re´sume´ and rate the candidate’s quality, seriousness about the job,
and ability to get along with coworkers.  Some subjects received a re´-
sume´ on lightweight clipboards, while others were given heavy clip-
boards.  Those given the heavy clipboards rated the applicant as
significantly better and more serious, while their ratings of “ability to
get along” were no different than that of the lightweight group.  The
researchers suggest that the tactile sensation of the heavy clipboard
tapped into unconscious associations between weight and seriousness
and importance.  They conclude, “Our understanding of the world is
not an abstract proposition but fundamentally depends on our mul-
tisensory experiences with it.”225
To the extent that older behavioral research studied the sense of
touch, it concluded that touch was incapable of communicating dis-
tinct emotions.  At best, touch could add hedonic tone (positive or
negative value) or intensity to other kinds of communications.226  In
many situations, it is difficult to isolate the role that touch plays from
the effects of speech or facial gesture.  Recent developments in haptic
technologies—technologies that allow tactile communication at a dis-
tance—provide evidence to support the notion that touch can com-
municate distinct emotions.227
In one study, subjects were given a simple haptic device—basi-
cally a computer joystick that reproduces the sender’s movements in
the receiver’s hands.228  Senders were asked to communicate a series
of distinct emotions by moving the joystick, and receivers were asked
to interpret the emotions being conveyed.  Receivers were able to rec-
ognize a number of distinct emotions at rates significantly higher than
chance.229  For example, participants typically expressed sadness using
slow, steady, short movements and joy in long, jerky, and fast move-
223 See Lawrence E. Williams et al., The Scaffolded Mind: Higher Mental Processes Are
Grounded in Early Experience of the Physical World, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1257, 1257,
1261–62 (2009).
224 See Ackerman et al., supra note 219, at 1713. R
225 Id.
226 See Hertenstein et al., supra note 217. R
227 See Alex Wright, The Touchy Subject of Haptics, COMM. ACM, Jan. 2011, at 20, 20–22
(2011) (describing new technologies that would allow more nuanced haptic interactions
than those widely used currently).
228 See Jeremy N. Bailenson et al., Virtual Interpersonal Touch: Expressing and Recognizing
Emotions Through Haptic Devices, 22 HUM.–COMPUTER INTERACTION 325, 333–36 (2007).
229 Id. at 342.
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ments.230  As these technologies improve and as people develop a
“language” for tactile gestures, the quality and emotional depth of
haptic communications will likely increase.
Traditional Western aesthetic theory excludes tactile pleasure
from the realm of aesthetic communication based in large part on the
assumption that touch is a communicatively weak sense.  In light of
the developments discussed above, this assumption appears increas-
ingly untenable.  Touch already plays an important aesthetic and com-
municative role in other populations.  Chinese culture has a tradition
of carving small objects designed to be carried in the pocket for the
joy of handling them.231  Furthermore, aesthetic experiences of touch
among blind persons suggest “a keenness and wholeness of aesthetic
delight as they approach art works through their fingers and hands,
which those gifted with sight often seem to miss, and which those with
sight might equally well receive.”232
2. Culinary Arts
Increased academic attention to how food can carry cultural
meaning matches the recent upswing in consumer interest in food
and cooking.  To whatever extent cooking received scholarly attention
previously, it was assumed incapable of communicating ideas or feel-
ings.233  The best a cook could hope to do was make the necessary
function of consumption a little more enjoyable.  Recent research in
the philosophy and anthropology of cuisine challenges this notion.234
From elite chefs in Chicago and New York to families around the
world, cooking is often a rich medium for sharing ideas and expres-
sing emotions.235
Clearly, diners who pay hundreds of dollars for dinner at the
world’s elite restaurants are not merely seeking calories and nutrients.
Nor are they attending simply because these restaurants produce bet-
ter tasting food than is available elsewhere.  If good taste was all they
were after, they might stay home and eat large plates of bacon (and
they would never pay to eat “burnt toast puree” at Alinea).  Part of the
attraction lies in the chef’s ability to creatively manipulate foods in
230 Id. at 340.
231 Herring, supra note 172, at 204. R
232 Id. at 205; see also Oliver Sacks, The Mind’s Eye: What the Blind See, in EMPIRE OF THE
SENSES: THE SENSUAL CULTURE READER 25, 25–41 (David Howes ed., 2005) (describing the
experiences of several blind persons and concluding that visual, auditory, intellectual,
emotional, and linguistic experiences are fused together in one’s mental landscape, rather
than being separate).
233 See supra Part II.A.
234 See, e.g., Carolyn Korsmeyer, Introduction: Perspectives on Taste, in THE TASTE CULTURE
READER: EXPERIENCING FOOD AND DRINK 2–8 (Carolyn Korsmeyer ed., 2005) (describing
chapters of the book that each challenge classic prejudices about food and drink).
235 See Buccafusco, supra note 25, at 1133–37. R
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ways that are expressive to the diners.  The dishes represent a conver-
sation between the chef and the diners in which tastes combine in
ways that are delicious as well as playful, novel, and meaningful.236
Philosopher Carolyn Korsmeyer studies the ways in which foods
create meaning.  She notes, “tastes convey meaning and hence have a
cognitive dimension that is often overlooked.  Foods are employed in
symbolic systems that extend from the ritual ceremonies of religion to
the everyday choice of breakfast.  Perhaps most obviously, eating is an
activity with intense social meaning for communities large and
small.”237  The most obvious way that foods express symbolic meaning
is through what Korsmeyer calls “representational food”—dishes
crafted to look like and remind the diner of something else, like crois-
sants, pretzels, and the Eucharistic bread and wine.238  Beyond sim-
ple visual representation, Korsmeyer explains that dishes can be
expressive in less obvious and more culturally nuanced ways.  She
writes, “Independent of tradition and context, tastes are not by them-
selves the bearers of meaning any more than are the colors of paints
straight out of the tube.”239  Particular tastes and the dishes to which
they contribute take on meaning by association with various events,
whether daily, weekly, or yearly.  In the contemporary United States,
turkey, stuffing, and pumpkin pie are associated with Thanksgiving,
and a chef can use these ingredients outside of the holiday season to
conjure some of the typical associations that diners have with these
tastes.240
Alfred Yen has noted that copyright law, although purporting not
to engage in aesthetic theorizing, in fact recognizes and uses a num-
ber of aesthetic theories, including formalism, authorial intent, insti-
tutionalism, and reader-response.241  The above sections about tactile
and gustatory communication make clear that these senses are capa-
ble of supporting aesthetic expression in a way that is qualitatively in-
distinct from the other senses and consistent with the aesthetic
demands of copyright law.242  To the extent that copyright law vari-
ously relies on theories that focus on authorial intent or reader-re-
sponse, there are creators who intend their works to carry aesthetic
236 See id.
237 CAROLYN KORSMEYER, MAKING SENSE OF TASTE: FOOD & PHILOSOPHY 4 (1999).
238 See id. at 118–20.
239 Id. at 136.
240 See id. at 137.
241 See Yen, supra note 170, at 251–52. R
242 I do not here argue whether quantitative distinctions between the senses might
remain.  In such a case, IP law’s separate treatment of the senses might arise from effi-
ciency concerns about the respective probabilities of generating meaningful communica-
tion through the different senses.  No one has yet proposed such an argument for their
differential treatment.
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meaning and a public who perceives them as so doing.243  Moreover,
one sees the development of institutional and formalist understand-
ings of the aesthetic capabilities of these senses.244
*****
Writers in the tradition of Western aesthetic theory have long
maintained that a qualitative divide separates the senses of sight and
hearing from those of touch, taste, and smell.  The high senses were
thought to be nonfunctional and unconstrained, while the low senses
were denigrated for their inability to carry meaningful aesthetic com-
munication.  New work in the social and behavioral sciences has un-
dermined both of these suppositions.  The differences between the
senses’ aesthetic limits and capacities now seem at best quantitative
and potentially subject to change.
IV
UNIFYING SENSORY EXPERIENCE IN IP LAW
Copyright and patent law each seek to promote the welfare of
society by encouraging the creation of valuable new works and inven-
tions.245  At first glance, it is difficult to understand why copyright law
is deemed the appropriate home of some works while patent law is the
domicile of others.  Good paintings and comfy chairs each seem to be
“useful” in some sense of the term.  The foregoing Parts argue that
the different treatment of the value of paintings and chairs is based on
the different human senses to which those objects appeal.  Copyright
law has isolated works that appeal to the senses of sight and sound,
while patent law has retained jurisdiction over works appealing to the
senses of touch, taste, and smell as well as those that do not appeal to
the body at all.  This doctrinal distinction draws on a tradition in West-
ern aesthetic theory that categorizes and ranks the senses as high and
low based on their presumed capacity for aesthetic experience.  This
tradition treats the high senses as the unique province of unrestrained
243 See Buccafusco, supra note 25, at 1134–35 (discussing the role of authorial intent R
and “reader” response in cuisine); Korsmeyer, supra note 234, at 140–41 (discussing one R
cook’s attempt to send a message about her family’s social and political situation by serving
a thin, displeasing sauce to visitors); Dominic M.M. Lopes, Art Media and the Sense Modali-
ties: Tactile Pictures, 47 PHIL. Q. 425, 431 (1997); Marieke Sonneveld, Dreamy Hands: Explor-
ing Tactile Aesthetics in Design, in DESIGN AND EMOTION: THE EXPERIENCE OF EVERYDAY THINGS
228, 228–32 (Deana McDonagh et al. eds., 2004) (discussing a course in tactile aesthetics
and its potential to expand participants’ awareness of and sensitivity to tactile aesthetics).
244 As the plaintiff in the KOOSH ball case noted, museums are becoming aware of the
value of allowing people to feel art.  Museums dedicated to tactility now exist in Phoenix,
Arizona, and Athens, Greece.  On the formal character of culinary creation, see generally
ANDREW DORNENBURG & KAREN PAGE, CULINARY ARTISTRY 61–85 (1996) (walking readers
through a variety of considerations when composing a dish).
245 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 18, at 1694. R
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aesthetics and culture and the low senses as base, functional, and bio-
logical.  New research in the social sciences and aesthetic theory, how-
ever, undermines this hierarchy.
This Part argues that IP law, at least as a formal, doctrinal matter,
should recognize the unity of sensory experience.  Appeals to the
senses of touch, taste, and smell should join those of sight and sound
in copyright’s realm.  Patent law should remain the appropriate
method for protecting products whose function is not directed at
communicating with the human body, as well as for “platform technol-
ogies” that enable but do not produce copyrightable expression (e.g.,
digital media, haptic devices, culinary methods, etc.).  This Part will
explore the contours of this proposal.
A. Uniting IP’s Treatment of the Senses
IP law treats tactile, gustatory, and olfactory pleasures as func-
tional and visual and aural pleasures as nonfunctional.246  To the ex-
tent that these pleasures are valued as a source of immediate
experiential pleasure, however, such a distinction is inappropriate.247
As Rudolph Arnheim writes,
[N]othing can be found that leads to a distinction between pleasure
derived from art and pleasure derived from any other source, as, for
instance, food.  The erroneous impression that there is a specific
“aesthetic pleasure” is due to the fact that a given component of a
mental state receives, from the total state, modifications that are eas-
ily attributed to the nature of the component itself.248
The same can be said of the ideas and emotions communicated by
touch, taste, and smell.  Visual experiences are not qualitatively differ-
ent from tactile experiences in their ability to communicate or express
ideas, emotions, or pleasures.
Accordingly, IP law should treat the communication of ideas,
emotions, or pleasures through any of the senses as nonfunctional ex-
pression.  For example, if a designer creates a series of movements
intended to communicate ideas, emotions, or pleasures to the senses
of the performer of the movements, those features that so communi-
cate are not functional in the copyright sense.  In other words, a work
does not automatically become a “useful article” solely because its in-
trinsic purpose is to express ideas to someone’s senses.
This is not to say that any touch, taste, or smell should necessarily
be copyrightable.  To merit copyright protection, a work of author-
ship still must meet the requirements of originality and minimal crea-
246 See supra Part II.B.
247 See DUTTON, supra note 22, at 52. R
248 RUDOLF ARNHEIM, Emotion and Feeling in Psychology and Art, in TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY
OF ART 302, 311 (1966).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 43  9-MAR-12 13:40
2012] MAKING SENSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 543
tivity.249  A single touch should be no more copyrightable than a
single musical note or a single word.250  As with musical notes and
words, the fundamental elements of touches, tastes, and smells are all
in the public domain.  Copyrightability, then, hinges on the author’s
ability to combine various features “‘in such a way’ as to render the
work as a whole original.”251  This standard has been used successfully
in copyright for compilation works, and it will likely prove helpful
here.252  The relevant question concerns the manner in which visual,
auditory, tactile, gustatory, or olfactory features have been combined.
The combination merits copyright protection if, when judged as a
whole,253 it constitutes an original and creative work of authorship.
To the extent that courts should draw distinctions between copy-
right and patent law,254 patent law should retain jurisdiction over the
standard technologies and inventions that make no reference to the
human body (e.g., a new method for getting paint to dry more quickly
or a faster pencil sharpener).  These “external” functions are useful in
the accepted sense of improving efficiency.  Additionally, two classes
of inventions that are directed at the human body would also still be
appropriately classified as patentable subject matter.
The first class includes products that affect the human body but
do not express or communicate ideas, emotions, or pleasures.  This
class might include devices that improve breathing, pastes that clean
teeth, or drugs that lower cholesterol.  Such products are used not for
communication but to satisfy other nonexpressive or nonemotional
preferences such as health or longevity.  Such products are analogous
to the use of a certain set of colors in a technological apparatus solely
because those colors improved the functioning of the machine.  Al-
249 See supra note 23. R
250 Producing a single emotion is not copyrightable.  As Judge Goddard explained,
“[e]motions, like mere ideas, are not subject to pre-emption; they are common property.
It is the incidents or elements, or grouping of them, which produce the emotion [sic] that
are to be compared.  Similar emotions may be caused by very different ideas.”  Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y 1929).
251 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006)) (discussing the requirements for a copyrightable compilation).
252 See, e.g., Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak, 773 F. Supp. 2d 419, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(applying 17 U.S.C. § 101).
253 Ironically, the standard for determining the copyrightability of compilations—the
“total concept and feel” test—employs a tactile metaphor. See Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
254 This Article does not express an opinion about the general merits of distinguishing
between copyrightable and patentable works.  Some copyrightable works may share more
with patentable inventions than they do with other copyrightable works (e.g., copyright-
able computer software may be more like patentable computer hardware or business meth-
ods than it is like movies or sculptures).  However, I simply argue that such distinctions
should not be made on the grounds of the perceived functionality or nonexpressiveness of
certain senses.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 44  9-MAR-12 13:40
544 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:501
though they are capable of being seen, they are functional and not
copyrightable.
One way of determining whether a given product falls into this
“functional” category is whether it is amenable to critical discourse.
For this purpose, expressive acts are generally susceptible to criticism
about the manner in which they have achieved their goals.  For exam-
ple, we might critique the manner in which a painter chose to express
the emotion of anger or a chef symbolized spring in New England.
According to Denis Dutton, such enterprises are generally complex
and open ended.255  In contrast, he notes that “[t]here is generally no
criticism applied to performances in the hundred-meter dash: the fast-
est time wins, no matter how inelegantly.”256  The same may be said
about cough suppressants and antifungal creams.257
The second class of products directed at the body that should
nonetheless be subject to patent protection are devices that serve as
platform technologies that enable but do not produce expression.
Just as the first person to discover papyrus could not have received a
copyright, so one who develops a new method for generating tactile,
gustatory, or emotional experiences has generated nothing copyright-
able.  Such technologies do not contribute any expression in their
own right; they merely make expression possible.  Accordingly, new
haptic devices, cooking methods, or atomizers deserve only patent
protection, if they deserve any IP protection at all.
This proposal will not obviate the conceptual separability analysis
for works that are appropriately classified as useful articles.  Under the
proposed regime, that a work’s intrinsic function is to communicate
ideas, emotions, or pleasures to the senses will not make it a useful
article.  Nonetheless, many products have features that combine visual
and tactile expression and standard, external functionality.  The cur-
rent approach to the senses asks whether the visual design features are
conceptually separable from the tactile and functional features.258
This Article’s proposal, in contrast, would ask whether combination of
visual and tactile features is conceptually separable from the func-
tional component.
Consider, once again, the KOOSH ball.  As the hypothetical ex-
amples at the beginning of this Article suggest, the KOOSH ball had
three distinguishable features: (1) it was easy for children to catch; (2)
it created pleasurable tactile sensations; and (3) it was visually appeal-
255 See DUTTON, supra note 22, at 55. R
256 Id.
257 Although we might want these products to avoid producing other inelegant side
effects.
258 See supra Parts I.A, I.C.
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ing.259  The Register of Copyrights and the district court treated the
first and second features as functional and therefore not subject to
copyright’s separability analysis.260  This Article’s proposal, however,
would treat only the first feature as functional, and it would perform
the appropriate separability analysis on the combination of the second
and third features.261  It might ask, for example, if the combination of
tactile and visual features was designed independently of the ball’s
function of being easily graspable,262 whether the combination engen-
ders in the mind of the beholder the concept of a work of art,263 or
whether there would be a market for the work if it did not function.264
The proposed change would result in substantially different doc-
trinal treatment of a number of areas of creative expression.  I want to
be clear: this Article takes no position on the economic value of such changes.
Many realms of creative expression currently lack strong IP protection
but nonetheless seem to function efficiently.265  In those cases, doctri-
nal changes that created IP rights where none had previously existed
would result in inefficient deadweight losses.  Those fields, however,
should be denied copyright protection on welfarist grounds rather
than on the basis of an incorrect and disingenuous assertion that they
are functional.  Additionally, there might be other legitimate grounds
for making doctrinal distinctions between the senses that would not
be problematic.  For example, if the error costs of administering the
copyright system for these works were too high or the number of
works that would qualify for protection were too low to justify the ben-
efits of protection, then sensory distinctions would be acceptable.
259 See supra Introduction.
260 See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, CIV. A. No. 89-0106, 1989 WL 214479, at *1–*3
(D.D.C. Oct. 3, 1989), aff’d, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
261 This Article takes no position on the propriety of the test for conceptual separabil-
ity or about the relative merits of design patent or copyright protection for useful articles.
262 Cf. Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004)
(addressing whether the design of a mannequin’s face reflected choices related to its utili-
tarian function).
263 Carol Barnhart Inc. v Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (New-
man, J., dissenting) (“[T]he requisite ‘separateness’ exists whenever the design creates in
the mind of the ordinary observer two different concepts that are not inevitably enter-
tained simultaneously.”).
264 See Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that evi-
dence bearing on a design’s marketability is relevant to determining that design’s aesthetic
qualities); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 131, § 2.08[B][3] (“[C]onceptual sepa- R
rability exists where there is any substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilita-
rian use it would still be marketable to some significant segment of the community simply
because of its aesthetic qualities.”).
265 See Buccafusco, supra note 25, at 1149–51 (food and restaurant industry); Dotan R
Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual
Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1789–1809
(2008) (stand-up comedy); Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 125, at 1698–1705, 1745–62 R
(fashion industry).
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These would be distinctions based on legitimate legal and policy
grounds, however, and not on incorrect analysis and reasoning.
It is worth briefly noting some potential doctrinal changes that
this Article’s proposal could bring about:
1. Dance, Exercise, and Movement
The current copyright statute provides protection for choreo-
graphic works that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression.266
Initially, such works were copyrightable as dramatic compositions if
they attempted to tell a story or convey some dramatic concept.267
Congress later removed that requirement to allow copyright for non-
dramatic and nonrepresentational choreographic works.268  Nonethe-
less, choreographic works are currently copyrightable on the basis of
the visual expression of ideas or emotions to the audience.  The law
does not countenance the possibility of expressing ideas or emotions
directly to the performers through the movements of their bodies and
the tension of their muscles.269  My proposal would allow copyright
law to incorporate that expression.
This proposal has significant implications for the copyrightability
of a variety of physical practices that generate proprioceptive
pleasures and emotions, including martial arts, yoga, and pilates.  In a
recent case, a court declared that the selection of a series of yoga
poses might demonstrate sufficient creativity to warrant copyright pro-
tection.270  This opinion has been the subject of considerable criticism
from the scholarly community.  According to William Patry,
Choreography is concerned with the aesthetic expression of ideas,
whether of a storytelling or abstract nature.  Exercises are func-
tional: If you do these routines, purported health, emotional, or
266 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (2006).
267 See Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 160 (2nd Cir. 1986).
268 See id. at 160–61.
269 Paul Bloom’s comments about music are also relevant to dance:
Most languages have a single word for both singing and dancing, and when
people listen to music while perfectly still, parts of the motor cortex and
cerebellum—the segments of the brain that have to do with moving
around—are active. . . .  It would be a scientific misstep, then, to develop a
theory of music that took the solitary and still appreciation of tonal patterns
as the central phenomenon that has to be explained.  This would be like a
theory of sex that only studied phone sex or a theory of food preference
built around research on people with no sense of smell.
PAUL BLOOM, HOW PLEASURE WORKS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WHY WE LIKE WHAT WE LIKE
125–26 (2010).  Similarly, it would be a misstep to have a theory of dance that only ac-
counted for the visual pleasure of seeing the dance, while ignoring the sensory pleasure of
performing it.
270 See Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182, 2005 WL 756558, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005).
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mental benefits will result.  Some routines may be more pleasing to
look at than others, but that is unrelated to their purpose.271
Patry has followed IP law’s traditional sensory dichotomy by distin-
guishing between the potentially copyrightable visual form of move-
ments and their functional bodily feel.  The appropriate distinction,
however, is between those features of the movements that are per-
formed to express ideas, emotions, or pleasures to the audience and
the performers and those that are performed for functional goals like
improving physical health.  Only if the movements are performed for
the inherent function of improving health should they be considered
useful, and then, only those components that are truly functional
should be separated.
In addition, under my proposal, rollercoasters that are designed
to convey a series of ideas, emotions, or pleasures to their riders would
be subject to copyright protection.  The original and minimally crea-
tive compilation of design elements in a rollercoaster would merit
copyright protection for the sequence of feelings that they create in
the bodies of their riders.
2. Tactile and Ergonomic Products
The designs of many products aim to create pleasing tactile sensa-
tions.  Clothing incorporates fabrics that feel good on the skin, furni-
ture is designed to generate a sense of bodily balance, and product
packaging can communicate information about the product.272
These and other tactile and ergonomic components may be eligible
for copyright protection to the extent that they communicate ideas,
emotions, or pleasures and are conceptually separable from the as-
pects that function to protect the skin, improve the posture, or en-
close the product, respectively.
3. Culinary Dishes
I have argued at length elsewhere that culinary dishes can meet
the formal demands of copyright law.273  While food consumption is
related to the functional caloric and nutritive demands of the body,
many aspects of eating are unrelated to the utility of minimal survival.
Almost all of our nutritional needs could be met without regard to the
flavor or aroma of the products that we eat and drink.  For example,
271 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4.22 (2010).
272 See Terry L. Childers & Joann Peck, Informational and Affective Influences of Haptics on
Product Evaluation: Is What I Say How I Feel?, in SENSORY MARKETING: RESEARCH ON THE SEN-
SUALITY OF PRODUCTS 63, 63 (Aradhna Krishna ed., 2010) (“The role of touch in product
evaluation is emerging as an important area of study in marketing and consumer behav-
ior.” (citations omitted)).
273 See Buccafusco, supra note 25, at 1130–40. R
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we may need to eat, but we do not need to taste.  Accordingly, the
aspects of culinary creations that are added to the basic nutritional
components of food products will often constitute separable efforts to
communicate ideas, emotions, or pleasures to diners.
I offer these observations as a purely doctrinal matter.  In each of
these fields where copyright protection is unavailable, the law proba-
bly reaches the right conclusion but for the wrong reason.  It is un-
clear whether the benefits of protecting products in these fields would
outweigh the costs.  For example, creativity in the food industry ap-
pears to be not only surviving but thriving despite a lack of strong IP
protection.274  Systems of social norms and a culture of sharing pro-
mote creativity and police piracy, at the same time avoiding the dead-
weight losses associated with formal IP rights.  Nonetheless, the
copyright system is better off if it is clear that withholding IP protec-
tion from cuisine is based on utilitarian principles and not the “func-
tionality” of culinary creations.  The same reasoning holds for the
other products described above.  Although formal IP protection may
not be warranted for dishes, fashion design, yoga, or rollercoasters
given the current state of incentives in those fields, it is possible that
we may want to revisit this conclusion at some point in the future.  If
we do, it is important that we understand how the senses function in
communication.
CONCLUSION
Both Bruce, the industrial designer, and Catherine, the visual art-
ist, contributed directly to the intellectual, hedonic, and emotional
well-being of society through their KOOSH ball creations.  Alice, the
mechanical engineer, in contrast, discovered a valuable method for
accomplishing a separate, external goal.  All three designers are wor-
thy of encouragement, but no sound principle exists for distinguish-
ing between Bruce’s and Catherine’s contributions.  That Bruce
intended his design to appeal to the touch while Catherine intended
her design to appeal to sight should not result in drastically different
treatment by IP law.  To the extent that it has in the past, this differen-
tial treatment has been based on problematic assumptions about the
differences between the senses.  IP law should evolve as our under-
standing of creativity and expression does, and it should eliminate the
distinction between the senses.  If Huxley’s “feelies” ever become a
reality, copyright law should embrace them.
274 See id. at 1151–55.
